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  …gij zult daarenboven leeren inzien, dat 
insgelijks de Javaan, sedert wij hem naar billijke wetten 
regeeren, sedert zijn persoonlijke rechten, zijn eigendom 
werden gewaarborgd, veel gelukkiger en meer welvarend is 
dan vroeger; en dit vooral omdat men hem wijselijk het genot 
blijft schenken: de bevelen rechtstreeks van zijn eigen hoofden 
te ontvangen. 
 
F.W. Junghuhn, Licht- en schaduwbeelden uit de binnenlanden 
van Java (Amsterdam: F. Günst, 1867): 324-5. 
 
 
4 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List Maps and of Illustrations .................................................................................................................. 5 
Preface ..................................................................................................................................................... 6 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 7 
1. From Company to state ..................................................................................................................... 16 
1.1 The cultivation system: ideology and practice ............................................................................ 17 
1.2 Moving beyond the cultivation system ....................................................................................... 21 
2. Sources of authority .......................................................................................................................... 24 
2.1 Modes of authority ...................................................................................................................... 24 
2.2 Differences in statecraft .............................................................................................................. 27 
2.3 The base for cooperation ............................................................................................................ 36 
3. Knowledge for power: the settlement of a symbiotic relation ......................................................... 40 
3.1 The information network ............................................................................................................ 41 
3.2 Direct encounters: methods of rule ............................................................................................ 50 
3.3 The resident as local king ............................................................................................................ 62 
4. Obstinacy of allies .............................................................................................................................. 66 
4.1 Evildoer or scapegoat? The case of the revolt in Pasuruan, 1833 .............................................. 67 
4.2 Disruptions in Cirebon ................................................................................................................. 73 
4.3. Improvements in control? Murder on Sumatra ......................................................................... 75 
4.4 The paradoxes of shared authority ............................................................................................. 77 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 79 
Appendix 1: Javanese titles and ranks................................................................................................... 82 
Appendix 2: Explanatory list of persons ................................................................................................ 84 
1. Governor-Generals of the Dutch East Indies (1808-1844) ............................................................ 84 
2. Dutch colonial officials .................................................................................................................. 85 
3. Javanese rulers, chiefs and other native servants......................................................................... 90 
Maps ...................................................................................................................................................... 92 
Glossary ................................................................................................................................................. 96 
List of references ................................................................................................................................. 109 
 
 
 
5 
 
List of Maps and Illustrations 
 
Maps 
Map 1: Java’s administrative divisions at the conclusion of Daendels’ term, 1811. ............................ 92 
Map 2: Java’s administrative divisions, 1832-1866............................................................................... 92 
Map 3: The Dutch East Indies, 1840. ..................................................................................................... 93 
Map 4: The principalities: Surakarta, Yogyakarta and Mangkunegaran on Central Java. .................... 94 
Map 5: Overview of the administrative divisions in the residency of Semarang. ................................ 95 
Map 6: Overview of the administrative divisions in the residency of Pasuruan................................... 95 
 
Illustrations 
Figure 1: Johannes van den Bosch ........................................................................................................ 18 
Figure 2: The regent of Pekalongan receives members of the Binnenlands Bestuur ........................... 54 
Figure 3: P. Sijthoff, resident of Semarang, and his golden payong ..................................................... 56 
Figure 4: Pangeran Adipati Arya Mangkunegara IV .............................................................................. 63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cover image: An assistant-resident with regent Raden Adipati Aryo Tjondroadinegara of Kudus and a 
controleur. Source: 3517 (foto, albuminedruk), Nederlands-Indië in foto's, 1860-1940, Koninklijk Instituut voor 
taal-, land- en volkenkunde (KITLV).  
 
6 
 
Preface 
 
In the prevalent image of colonialism, the biased depiction of European artists, writers, scientists and 
eventually colonizers of non-European cultures created the stereotypes of the colonized domains and 
people that for these Europeans legitimized European rule over their colonies. Typical colonial thinking 
comprised a feeling of superiority, expressed in the relations the European dominators enforced and 
maintained in the areas they controlled in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To a 
modern-day historian, this attitude obviously seems conceited, complacent, and, most of all, outdated. 
But even half a century after colonial domination, the traces of orientalist thinking remain vivid in 
academic and non-academic debates, (re)creating rigorous distance between West and East. Very clear 
boundaries in the roles of the colonizer and colonized state were persistently maintained in 
historiography, giving each historical figure a strictly delineated task in history. 
That the distance between east and west is not as obvious as alleged in current historiography 
becomes very clear when studying precolonial, colonial, and post-colonial societies without focussing 
merely on differences and demarcations. Though cross-cultural differences have been a constant 
obstacle in the fluent mutual understanding of all parties in colonial systems, the borders in the 
relation between colonizer and colonized became much vaguer and more hybrid than we usually 
imagine. Studying the colonial relationship of Europeans and Asians shows remarkable similarities in 
the historic perception of different peoples and different cultures, and makes us reconsider or own 
biases and perceptions of the societies and cultures of the areas we travel and explore. This thesis is 
the product of archival research conducted in Jakarta. More than once, I cursed this city and the 
country of which it is the capital for its bureaucracy, complicated and incomprehensible unwritten 
rules, or lack of tranquillity and air-conditioning. But being biased may have been a major contributing 
factor in my frustrations.  
For me, not only history, but also the environment where I studied helped me to overcome my 
biases. I am very grateful to staff of the ANRI for helping me in conducting my research, but also for 
providing me with great insight into Indonesian culture, bureaucracy and all other puzzling peculiarities 
a naive European student encounters when visiting the insane metropolis that surrounds the National 
Archives of Indonesia for the first time. My research and stay in Jakarta were made considerably easier 
by working closely together with the archivists of ANRI. Thanks to the hospitable people working at 
ANRI, I learned a lot about Indonesian history, but perhaps even more about modern day Indonesia. 
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Introduction 
 
At the end of the eighteenth century, Dutch presence in Asia had been rooted for two centuries on a 
commercially driven trading company-system. The VOC (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie), the 
Dutch East India Trading Company, had become the largest actor in the Indian Ocean trading zone, 
shipping tons of various goods among cities and trading factories across the Asian seas. However, 
during the last years of the eighteenth century, the Company collapsed under influence of rapid 
political and economic change in Europe and Asia, while the Dutch state transformed radically as a 
consequence of the disruptions of the Napoleonic Wars. The VOC went bankrupt, and ceased to exist 
in 1799.1 While the British started to increasingly dominate South- and Southeast Asia, the Dutch 
maintained their position in Indonesian archipelago. The focus was put on Java, which had been the 
home base of the VOC’s headquarters for two centuries, but Dutch control over the other islands 
remained relatively weak. During the eighteenth century, the VOC had gradually consolidated its 
control over Java by intervening diplomatically and militarily in the internal disputes of the ruling 
dominant kingdoms of Mataram and Banten.2 In the Preanger3 (or Priangan) area, the mountainous 
area in West-Java, VOC officials had enforced contracts with the local nobility for the production of 
coffee, tea, and other valuable cash crops. The vast production of these cash crops replaced the VOC-
trade in spice, silk and other products, and was reorganized in 1830, when Governor-General Johannes 
van den Bosch (1780-1844, in office 1830-1833) implemented the cultivation system.4  
This system utilized the native population of Java by forcefully employing the peasants on the 
cash-crop fields. These peasants were mobilized by their own native heads, who were recruited by the 
Dutch as agents of the new system. The implementation of this type of control over the entire 
population of Java was a new step in the complicated process of the settlement of the colonial state 
in the Dutch East Indies. The historic study of the cultivation system has accentuated its economic 
impact on Java and the moral problem of forced production and colonial exploitation in general. 
Cornelis Fasseur, Robert Elson, Robert van Niel and Jan Breman discussed the outlines of the system’s 
economic policy and its effect on the Netherlands and Java.5 However, the role of the native heads as 
                                                          
1 J. van Goor, De Nederlandse koloniën: geschiedenis van de Nederlandse expansie, 1600-1975 (Den Haag: SDU 
Uitgeverij Koninginnegracht, 1994): 189. 
2 W. Nitisastro, Population trends in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970): 11. 
3 Non-English concepts, words, and terms are displayed in italics, (only) when used for the first time, and all of 
these are incorporated in the glossary at the end of this thesis. 
4 For a full review of all persons in this thesis, see appendix 2. 
5 C. Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel en koloniale baten: de Nederlandse  exploitatie van Java, 1840-1860 (PhD thesis; 
Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1975); R.E. Elson, Village Java under the Cultivation System, 1830-1870 (ASAA 
Southeast Asia Publication Series no. 25; Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994); R. Van Niel, Java under the 
cultivation system: collected writings (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1992); J. Breman, Koloniaal profijt van onvrije arbeid: 
het Preanger stelsel van gedwongen koffieteelt op Java (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010). 
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intermediaries in the Dutch system makes the 1830s very interesting from the perspective of the 
expansion of colonial governance as well. The system was still new and fresh, while neither the Dutch 
officials nor the Javanese heads knew how to interpret the exuberant ideas of Van den Bosch, as Dutch 
concepts about how to cooperate with the indigenous on such a large-scale elite were still flexuous 
and not fully developed. This thesis attempts to readdress the 1830s from a perspective that focusses 
on the formation of colonial governance. It seeks to examine how and why the Dutch penetrated so 
deep into Javanese politics, by investigating the relation between the Dutch and Javanese controllers 
and the exercise of colonial governance on local level. This relation, as I will argue, formed the bedrock 
of the Dutch colonial state in the nineteenth century. 
Colonial statecraft became of increasing importance during the nineteenth century. In various 
regions all over Asia, European colonizers started to organize overseas governance. Whereas in the 
early eighteenth century in South- and Southeast Asia the trading companies had predominantly 
controlled their businesses via trading treaties and political bonds with native rulers, the region 
underwent profound change during the nineteenth century. By the beginning of the twentieth century, 
most colonies were shaped into distinctive political and administrative units, centrally governed 
through bureaucratic administrations.6 British India for example, was ruled under charter of the East-
India Company until the Indian Mutiny of 1858, after which the British slowly consolidated the entire 
Indian subcontinent under the centrally organized rule of the British crown. British India is believed to 
have produced the models of ‘indirect rule’ (see below) that were later consciously adopted elsewhere 
in the empire.7 Standardized by Sir Frederick Lugard’s ideas in the Dual Mandate of 1922, indirect rule 
became a vital element in setting up economically profitable colonial state-production of rubber and 
other resources.8 All over South- and Southeast Asia and Africa, the influence of European colonial 
powers shaped not only the borders and administrations of, but also the local dimension and 
territoriality within the twentieth-century decolonized states. Mary Davies’ recent dissertation about 
chieftaincy in Malawi shows that use of indirect rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
could strongly reshape the role of local chiefs, within the framework of the colonial state. According 
to Davies, “the idea that chiefs could be political actors came to the fore”, which created new breeding 
ground to draw authority from.9  Moreover, this always happened in cooperation with native elites 
and chiefs. 
                                                          
6 C.A. Trocki, ‘Political structures in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’ in: N. Tarling (ed.), The 
Cambridge history of Southeast Asia Vol. II: The nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992): 79-130: 79. 
7 M.H. Fisher, Indirect rule and the residency system, 1764-1858 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991): 459. 
8 Ibidem: 296-9; M. Davies, The locality of chieftainship: territory, authority and local politics in northern Malawi, 
1870-1974 (PhD thesis, CNWS; Leiden: 2014). 
9 Davies, The locality of chieftainship: 8-9. 
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The establishment of colonial states was not a carefully planned process. In fact, even under 
influence of European domination plenty of indigenous rulers in the Dutch East Indies maintained a 
high level of sovereignty during the era of the formation of the colonial state. As this thesis will try to 
show, the colonial state-institutions of the Dutch East Indies had an informal, impermanent, personal, 
malleable and negotiable character.10 Cooperation with the local nobles, chiefs and administrative 
elites was a sheer necessity. As Carl Trocki notes, European administrators possessed both the will and 
the capability to destroy old orders and thus believed they had the power to create new orders, but 
eventually they were not able to create “what they imagined.”11 Often they blamed this gap between 
aims and achievements to the ‘laziness’, ‘incompetence’, or other aspects of moral and cultural 
inferiority of their Asian counterparts with whom they cooperated. Although military and economically 
stronger, the Europeans were simply “too thin on the ground to undertake the task of day-to day 
administration on any but a fairly high level.”12 Effectively, the former trading partners became the 
essential middlemen in the establishment of the colonial administration. 
Direct rule and indirect rule: the residency system 
Ideas about how the colonial state was to be shaped varied widely in the European discourse about 
expansion in Asia, but a clear ideological difference can be noted between indirect and ‘direct’ rule. 
Direct rule proposed the creation of a strong administrative European body that immediately 
controlled the colonies’ daily routine, legal apparatus and economy, while indirect rule used ‘native’ 
authorities, ancient ruling dynasties and local administrative elites to carry out rule under supervision 
of their European masters. However, this division does not reflect the reality of colonial government 
on the ground. As exemplified by Michael Fisher on India, to the British officials and politicians, indirect 
rule on the model of the traditional princely states in India remained not just a method, but also a goal 
or an ideal type in itself over the nineteenth century.13 When the East India Company shifted its 
character from primarily a commercial to a political entity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
the relation with the Indian states altered.14 The Company installed so-called residents, officials 
residing close to the courts of these states, charged with managing these relations. To the colonizers, 
indirect rule provided an ideal form of localized government that helped them to maintain distance 
from, but at the same time hold a firm grip on the Asian and African masses, by controlling their 
indigenous rulers. However, in order to cooperate with the native rulers the residents had to adopt 
practices and rituals drawn from the native diplomatic traditions, and as the contacts with the native 
                                                          
10 Elson, ‘International commerce, the state and society: economic and social change’ in: The Cambridge history 
of Southeast Asia II: 131-95: 131. 
11 Trocki, ‘Political structures’: 81. 
12 Ibidem: 81, 87. 
13 Fisher, Indirect rule: 2, 4-5. 
14 Ibidem:66. 
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princes intensified and the duties of the residents expanded over the course of the nineteenth century, 
it became less clear whether they were practicing indirect or direct rule.15 The residency system in 
India had grown into a unique but paradoxical institution. While ideologically direct rule tried to 
enforce Western rule and exclude indigenous influence, and indirect rule aimed at incorporating and 
using indigenous structures, both seem to have intermingled easily throughout different levels of 
control. As Fisher and J.S. Furnivall have noted, the theoretical difference between both was not that 
great in practice. The terms are ideal-types, not precise nor technically defined, and as a result they 
were ideologically different but practically mixed and hybrid.16 
In the decades after the downfall of the VOC, a residency system similar to the one in British 
India’s princely states took shape. During the British interregnum on Java of 1811-1816, Governor-
General Thomas Stamford Raffles (1781-1826) had split up the existing nine residents of Daendels into 
sixteen residencies, and under the reorganizations of Governor-Generals Godert van der Capellen 
(1778-1848, in office 1816-1826), Leonard Du Bus de Gisignies (1780-1849, in office 1826-1830) and 
Van den Bosch, 25 residencies in total were formed up until 1840 (see map 2).17 As the practical 
irrelevance of the division between indirect and direct has been pointed out, the question arises how 
Dutch officials, while so ‘thin on the ground’, were able to exercise control and implement a taxation 
system that regenerated the Dutch colonial economy and made Java one of the largest cash-crop 
producers of the nineteenth century. More specifically, how was colonial rule in the residencies, on 
local level, exercised? How did Dutch residents, yet unexperienced, manage social relations with their 
Javanese counterparts? And to move beyond the geographic limits of my subject: can we identify 
specific methods or instruments of colonial officials in their attempts to rule in cooperation with native 
elites? Answering these questions will hopefully help us understand the practice of colonial rule, and 
the meaning of the relation between the Dutch and the native elites on Java and other parts of the 
colonized world of the nineteenth century. 
The Dutch residents each controlled a residency divided in up to five regencies that all stood under 
native supervision of high noblemen the Dutch called regents or Bupati. As I will argue, the relation 
between residents and regents was of crucial importance. The resident was the highest Dutch 
authority ‘on the ground’. In the words of the novelist Multatuli, the most famous critic of the 
cultivation system: “It is these residents who actually represent the Dutch reign over the Javanese 
                                                          
15 Fisher, Indirect rule: 6, 66-67. 
16 Ibidem: 4, 429-30; J.S. Furnivall, Colonial policy and practice: a comparative study of Burma and Netherlands 
India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938): 8-10, 218-9. 
17 From West to East these were (in modern spelling): Banten, Batavia, Buitenzorg, Karawang, the Priangan, 
Cirebon, Tegal, Pekalongan, Banyumas, Bagelen, Kedu, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Jepara, Rembang, 
Madiun, Pacitan, Kediri, Surabaya, Pasuruan, Madura, Probolinggo, Besuki and Banyuwangi. During the 
nineteenth century, the boundaries of the residencies changed several times due to administrative 
reorganization. 
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population. The people do not know the Governor-General nor the members of the ‘Raad van Indië’ 
(the advisory body under the Governor-General), nor the directors in Batavia. They know just the 
resident, and the officials who govern them.”18 On the other hand, the regents held the key to 
controlling and manipulating the population. The connection of a resident to ‘his’ regents was thus 
decisive for the success of local governance. Historiography so far has acknowledged the importance 
of the relation between residents and regents. Dutch colonial governance in the nineteenth century 
has been described as a ‘dual administration’, of two layers of control: a native and a Dutch one. But 
Dutch authors who used this term, like Wim van den Doel and Fasseur, mostly concentrated on colonial 
governance at high level, and ignored the importance of local cooperation.19 Fasseur and Van den Doel 
both concluded that the policymaking of the High-Government not always reached down to the 
regents, but so far it has remained unclear why.20  
At this point there has never been an in-depth study into the exact methods of the residents in 
dealing with the regents in the formative years of the Dutch colonial state. This thesis will thus try to 
fill in this gap and investigate the connection between residents and regents. It follows the examples 
of Benedict Anderson, Soemarsaid Moertono and Sartono Kartodirdjo, who, among others, have 
described the underlying concepts and functioning of Javanese states, and Benjamin Schrieke and Jan 
Bakker, who have both connected these concepts to what Max Weber called the patrimonial state. I 
will use Max Weber’s difference between traditional and rational authority to examine the Javanese 
regents’ and Dutch officials’ positions prior to and after the introduction of the cultivation system. The 
observations of these authors clarify the difference and similarities between both Dutch and Javanese 
types of statecraft, which helps us to create understanding of the roots of colonial governance. Highly 
interesting is the work of Heather Sutherland. Published in 1979, her book thoroughly discusses how 
Dutch colonial offices and Javanese native rulers exercised influence on each other in what she calls 
“an unequal political partnership, the essential hinge of which was the sustained contact between the 
Binnenlands Bestuur” (‘BB’; the European civil service) “and the Pangreh Praja” (the native colonial 
civil service under Dutch control; lit. ‘rulers of the realm’).21 Because Sutherland’s work mainly deals 
with the transformation of the priyayi-elite (the native aristocratic elite) and the role of the Dutch in 
this process on the long term (throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century), this thesis may be 
                                                          
18 Multatuli, Max Havelaar, of de koffieveilingen der Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij (Amsterdam: 
Uitgeverij Prometheus/Bert Bakker, 1998): 93. Quoted Dutch primary sources are translated into English. 
19 H.W. van den Doel, De stille macht: het Europees binnenlands bestuur op Java en Madoera, 1808-1942 (PhD 
thesis; Amsterdam/Leiden: Bert Bakker, 1994); Fasseur, De Indologen: ambtenaren voor de oost, 1825-1950 
(Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1993). 
20 Van den Doel, De stille macht: 102-4; Fasseur, ‘Een koloniale paradox: De Nederlandse expansie in de 
Indonesische archipel in het midden van de negentiende eeuw (1830-1870)’ in: Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 92 
(1979): 162-86. 
21 H. Sutherland, The making of a bureaucratic elite: the colonial transformation of the Javanese Priyayi (ASAA 
Southeast Asia Publication Series no.2; Singapore: Heinemann, 1979): xix, 2.  
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considered a prequel to her work. It tries to define the ground elements that gave shape to this 
relation. 
I should also mention the creation, growth, and professionalization of the Dutch colonial army, 
officially founded in 1830. Initiated in the aftermath of the Java War, one would expect the colonial 
army, or KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger), to become of great importance. Indeed, the 
presence of this army in the archipelago maintained a certain menace looming behind the Dutch 
presence. The increase in the military expenses, the incorporation of regents in the KNIL, and the 
establishment of Fort Willem I in Ambarawa near Semarang consolidated Dutch military power on 
Java. However, the role of the army remained limited, as threatening with violence often was just as 
effective as using it, and the troops were mostly deployed in the wars on Sumatra, and rarely on Java. 
Firmly controlled via bonds and treaties with loyal regents, diplomacy became more important than 
muscle flexing in setting up the cultivation system and a colonial state. For this reason I will not 
incorporate the role of the KNIL in this thesis, but rather focus on the role of diplomacy. 
Methodology and sources 
The only way to directly perceive the practice of local rule carried out by the residents is by studying 
the archives of the residencies. These can be found in in the ANRI (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia), 
the National Archives of Indonesia in Jakarta. These residency archives contain all correspondence 
between Dutch officials and native rulers. They include massive amounts of letters from and to native 
rulers on all local levels of governance. Most archival material is correspondence between residents, 
assistant-residents (the rank below resident) and controleurs (the rank below assistant-residents), and 
regents, district heads and village heads. These letters are sometimes in Javanese (when written by 
native heads), and sometimes in Malay, but often translated into Dutch, and give great insight into the 
Dutch-Javanese relation. The residency archives are the only source through which one can discover 
the cross-cultural interaction on Java in the 1830s. They allows us to illustrate the Dutch vision on and 
understanding of the Javanese nobility, but also the Javanese attitude towards the Dutch. 
Unfortunately, the archival material is difficult to use for profound systematic research, as not all of it 
has been inventoried, and large parts are not in great physical shape. On top of that, the majority of 
the archival material is one-sided, Eurocentric, and incomplete. One can find numerous letters of a 
certain regent to a resident without being able to trace the resident’s replies, and Dutch reflections on 
the Javanese society are very extensive while Javanese perceptions on the Dutch are much harder to 
find, even though numerous Javanese letters have been preserved. However, by studying 
correspondence between the Dutch and Javanese, a number of elements that define the roots of 
colonial government can be perceived. To get a grip on the vast amount of correspondence, I 
specifically focused on correspondence between residents and regents and reports written by Dutch 
13 
 
officials about the local native aristocracy. To make efficient use of the limited time I had, I used a 
rather opportunistic approach. I selected those residencies of which the archives have been 
inventoried best and made accessible, and browsed to the bundles that seemed to contain the type of 
correspondence (‘incoming’ or ‘outgoing’ letters for  specific year) and reports I was looking for. It 
could take days before I finally got my hands on one of those wonderful bundles that literally bulge 
with interesting reports and letters, but always they were definitely worth the trouble it took finding 
them. 
By doing so I have selected interesting and so far unexplored material from the residency of 
Semarang on Central Java. Correspondence between the residents and various regents reveals 
interesting details about the local Dutch-Javanese encounter and supports the idea that the favour and 
reliability of the regents, and the diplomatic abilities and character of the resident mattered most. 
Other case-studies I used are mentioned in historiography, and are great to elaborate on by using new 
information form the residency archives. Of great quality is the research of Vincent Houben, who 
writes interesting chapters on the relation between Dutch officials and native rulers at the court of the 
vorstenlanden or principalities (on Central Java), the princely states that remained de facto 
independent from the Dutch.22 The case of Surakarta, one of the principalities, will be elaborated on 
in chapter three, amplified with material from the residency archives in ANRI. Finally, interesting cases 
of obstinacy and tensions between Dutch officials and the local elite and people were found in the 
archives of Pasuruan and the outer territories on the West-Coast of Sumatra. The former case is 
mentioned in the work of Elson and Van Niel, but not described in detail, the latter was found in the 
National Archives of the Netherlands in the Hague.23 
The kind of archival material I use can give us new insights into the actual reality of colonial rule. 
It supports the claim that the concept of direct or indirect rule do not cover this reality, but that colonial 
rule was personal, and, as I will attempt to clarify in chapter three and four, just as patrimonial as 
traditional Javanese rule. The concepts of traditional and legal authority as well as different concepts 
of statecraft intermingled in the colonial world. These insights support Van Niel’s claim that the 
colonial state was most of all a ‘system of men.’24 
I will bear in mind the warnings of Ann Laura Stoler, that the colonial system’s archival records 
are hardly objective and do not provide us with neutral and complete concepts of the colonial society, 
                                                          
22 V.J.H. Houben, Kraton and Kumpeni: Surakarta and Yogyakarta, 1830-1870 (Verhandelingen van het KITLV 
164; Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994). 
23 Elson, Village Java: 95; Van Niel,  Java under the Cultivation system: 41-2. 
24 Van Niel: Java under the Cultivation system: 88. 
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as they were written by the people who were products of this society themselves.25 The construction 
of archival material is problematic and can lead to misconceptions between those who constructed it 
and those who read it nowadays, as Stoler noted.26 By treating the archives not merely as a sources of 
historical information, but as subjects of the colonial government, and thus of themselves, we can 
overcome these problems. In general, we should realize that the study of colonial rule is problematic 
when “the tools of analysis we use emerged from the history we are trying to examine.”27 This is exactly 
why I choose to incorporate the ideas of Weber, Anderson and Indonesian scholars such as Kartodirdjo 
and Moertono. They can give us tools that are not directly related to the colonial world. On top of that, 
the local archives in Jakarta show a more detailed and profound picture of the formation of the early 
colonial state, certainly concerning the 1830s. Elson for example carried out a lot of research in Jakarta 
and successfully changed our view on the impact of the cultivation system on the village communities 
of Java. Stoler uses neither the archives in Jakarta, nor the work of Dutch or Indonesian scholars, and 
therefore she might have gotten an incomplete picture of the colonial archives and reality.28 By making 
intensive use of the residency archives, we can enlarge our knowledge of the relation and cooperation 
between Dutch and Javanese in the context of early colonial state-formation, and thereby revise our 
perception of Dutch colonial rule in its totality. 
Two important issues should be mentioned here. The first is about language. All outgoing letters 
of the material I used are in Dutch, but the incoming letters are not. Incoming letters from regents 
were usually translated by the clerks of the residents’ offices, but not always, and not always in Dutch. 
The majority of letters I use were translated into Dutch, and roughly ten percent of them was 
translated into Malay. With some assistance of the staff of ANRI I was able to interpret these as well. 
The untranslated letters were not taken into account for this thesis, as the translated ones provided 
more than enough material. A second problem is the limitation of the archival material concerning 
locality and historicity. As Fasseur, Van Niel and Elson have noted, the implementation and practice of 
the cultivation system knew many regional varieties.29 This applies to my own findings, and supports 
                                                          
25 A.L. Stoler, Along the archival grain: epistemic anxieties and colonial common sense (Princeton/Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2009): 3, 19-20. 
26 Ibidem: 3, 11-13. 
27 F. Cooper, Colonialism in question: theory, knowledge, history (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California 
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the general claim that colonialism was neither monolithic nor unchanging throughout history.30 The 
representativeness of my case-studies is therefore hard to judge. As mentioned, I selected my sources 
strictly based on accessibility, physical condition and relation to current historiography. Because we 
simply do not yet have comprehensive accounts on the local elaboration of dual rule, I can only vouch 
for a comparison among my sources from Semarang, Surakarta, Pasuruan and Sumatra. The 
conclusions drawn from the case studies that I used should thus never be overstated, and always seen 
in the right context of the versatility and hybridity of colonialism. However, these cases alone give us 
enough fresh information to point out the first important revisions of the relation between Dutch and 
Javanese. The few examples I used already enable us to get as close as possible to a better view on the 
reality of colonial governance on the ground. 
I hope to make clear that the residency archives show that in the Dutch-Javanese encounter the 
colonizer did not always construct the colonized.31 A story of politics, diplomacy and 
institutionalization set in the years in between the era of the trading companies and large-scale 
imperialism, the first steps of the development of colonial governance were taken based on the 
relation between the residents and the regents. The former influenced the latter, and both depended 
on each other. A paradox of mutual and conflicting interests, the colonial relationship between Dutch 
and Javanese founded colonial governance in the Dutch East Indies. 
  
                                                          
30 N.B. Dirks, ‘Introduction: colonialism and culture’ in: N.B. Dirks (ed.), Colonialism and culture (Ann Arbor: 
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31 N. Brimnes, ‘From civil servant to little king: an indigenous construction of colonial authority in early 
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1. From Company to state 
 
Java became the centre of Dutch agricultural production during the nineteenth century. Until then the 
island was of lesser importance, producing mainly rice and timber, not the most interesting goods in 
the inter-Asian trading network of the VOC compared to the opium from China, the textiles from India 
and the spices from the Moluccas. However, the disruptions of the French, American and Industrial 
revolutions, the fall of the Batavian Republic and the demise of the VOC at the end of the eighteenth 
and beginning of the nineteenth century caused heavy disruptions that heralded the end of Dutch 
trade in these valuable goods.32 At the same time events like the slave rebellion on and independence 
of Santo Domingo from 1791 onward and disruptions in the Antilles and Brazil caused a steep decline 
of sugar and coffee production in the colonies in the West, and created room on the global market for 
these increasingly popular products.33 Van den Bosch knew that profits from the western colonies were 
decreasing, and contrived the cultivation system as a solution to pull the Dutch economy out of the 
doldrums and reengage in the competition with other European powers (especially the British), by 
giving the industry a major impulse with investments in similar products in the eastern colonies.34 
During the nineteenth century, Java became one of the most predominant suppliers on the market for 
coffee, sugar, indigo and tobacco. However, the shifts in power and policy during the first three 
decades of the nineteenth century exemplify that the road to this outcome was long, curvy and 
difficult. In this chapter I will briefly sketch the developments that led to the introduction of the 
cultivation system on Java, the basic structures of Van den Bosch’ colonial ideology and policy and 
shortly describe the intense and heated historiographical debates about the system. 
Initially the Dutch were rather hesitant in deciding about a colonial policy after the demise of the 
VOC. Ideologically the government doubted between a between a liberal, laissez-faire approach of 
free-trade and a more conservative policy of forced cultivation as had existed in the Preanger regencies 
under the VOC.35 The most important propagandist of the liberal-enlightened ideology was Dirk van 
Hogendorp. His ideas were mainly opposed by Sebastiaan Cornelis Nederburgh, who favoured a more 
                                                          
32 Kwee H.K., ‘How strangers became kings: Javanese Dutch relations in Java, 1600-1800’ in: Indonesia and the 
Malay World 36/105 (2008): 293-307: 303. 
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18de eeuw (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2000): 188-9, 195-6, 295; P. Boomgaard, ‘Java’s agricultural production 
1775–1875’ in: A. Maddison and G. Prince (eds.), Economic growth in Indonesia 1820–1940 
(Dordrecht/Providence: Foris Publications, 1989): 97-131: 99-100. 
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35 Van den Doel, Het rijk van Insulinde: opkomst en ondergang van een Nederlandse kolonie (Amsterdam: 
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detached policy, as he was convinced that the Netherlands would not be able to ‘educate’ the Javanese 
properly or intervene in Javanese policy successfully, but should rather make use of existing, 
indigenous structures to concentrate on generating profit instead of establishing good governance. 
While the Netherlands were under Napoleonic rule, Governor-General Herman Willem Daendels 
(1762-1818, in office 1808-1811) laid the foundations of the Dutch colonial state by taking the first 
steps in introducing a modern bureaucratic administration on Java and Mudara. Raffles had sought to 
reduce the influence of the regents by imposing a system of landrent – taxation on land imposed 
directly on the peasants.36 Raffles despised the position and cultural importance of the regents; an 
enlightened liberal, he had a strong aversion against the traditional but powerful authority of these 
chiefs and favoured contact with the village heads, who he thought stood closest to the peasants. 
Governor-General Van der Capellen acknowledged the problems the regents had with their recent 
degradations, and he standardized their titles as connected to their positions in 1820, but due to lack 
of centralization and institutionalization their positions remained uncertain and problematic 
throughout Java.37 This hesitant and fluctuating policy towards the regents created the breeding 
ground for tensions between Dutch and Javanese and a negative attitude towards European 
dominance in general. A local prince in Yogyakarta, Pangeran Dipanagara, profited from these tensions 
and rallied support for a large-scale rebellion against the Dutch authorities, culminating in the bloody 
and destructive Java War of 1825-1830. This war had left a deep impact on the island and shocked the 
colonial officials. Java had become a colonial problem, for which king William I was in urgent need of 
a solution. He found this solution in the ideas of Johannes van den Bosch. 
1.1 The cultivation system: ideology and practice 
 
Van den Bosch was a self-made man. Born in a patrician family as the son of a barber surgeon he 
started his career as an officer in the Dutch East Indian military. A strong leader and decorated war-
veteran (see figure 1), he quickly ascended in rank.38 After a dispute with Daendels he returned to the 
Netherlands, where he engaged in the political debate about colonial policy.39 His first writing criticized 
Daendels’ policy and responded to Raffles’ critique on VOC-rule and exploitation in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. Raffles was surprised by the Dutch lack of knowledge about Javanese culture 
and statecraft after two centuries of presence and blamed them for continuing a policy aimed at 
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Figure 1: Johannes van den Bosch (1780-1844), portrait by Cornelis Kruseman, 1829 (Portret van 
Johannes, Graaf van den Bosch, Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederlands-Indië, minister van koloniën). 
The appearance of Van den Bosch in this painting is clearly one of a courageous and strong high 
army officer, decorated with the ‘Militaire Willems-Orde’, holding his plans firmly in his hand and a 
map of Java behind his right elbow. 
 Source: Rijksmuseum, object number SK-A-2166. 
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merely seeking direct financial profit supported by cruelty and violence.40 The English attitude towards 
the Dutch never was very positive: what started as “grudging admiration” turned into disdain as the 
British became more aware of the Dutch military and commercial weaknesses in Asia in comparison to 
the recent British successes.41 According to Raffles, the Dutch were cruel and rapacious in their 
relentless pursuit of profit, and had seriously damaged and undermined the ingenious state structures 
in the Indonesian archipelago, blocking possibilities for modernization and development.42 Van den 
Bosch, in his turn, was not impressed by these critiques, referring to the failed liberalizing experiments 
of the British on Java, which had resulted in Raffles handing back a bankrupt colony in 1816.43 
For Van den Bosch the purpose of the Dutch possessions in the archipelago was clear: Java was 
what he called a wingewest, a crown domain of the Netherlands to be used solely to generate large 
agricultural profits.44 Van den Bosch was not impressed with the Javanese societal establishments, 
which he thought were “still in state of childhood.”45 He figured that there were only two ways to put 
the Javanese peasants to work in service of the Dutch: either via barter trade on a very basic level or 
by obligating them to work on cash crop fields. The latter he thought needed to be systematized by 
collecting taxes on production, using the regents and other native rulers.46 According to Van den Bosch, 
under Daendels and Raffles the regents had become detached from the Europeans and the only way 
to make use of the Javanese labour force and to prevent a new war was by regenerating and improving 
the relations with the regents by including them in the Dutch colonial system.47 He strongly opposed 
the idea of liberalizing or educating Java’s native population with western ideological concepts, as he 
thought Javanese people were not able to understand those and were not interested in a replacement 
of their “superstitious mysticism.”48 It was thus important not to interfere in local politics, but to make 
use of local ideologies and local structures of governance. Van den Bosch did not see the Javanese 
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peasants as full trading-partners, but as a workforce, necessary to carry out colonial agricultural 
production for the global market, ruled via their own traditional administrative elite.49  
Van den Bosch drew the attention of King William I when he founded the so-called ‘Maatschappij 
der Weldadigheid’ (Benevolent Society), that tried to help poor people in the Netherlands by building 
‘free-colonies’, small agricultural communities, where poor people were sheltered and helped to start 
new lives as farmers. In 1827 Van den Bosch was appointed Governor-General of the Dutch colonies 
in the West, where he imposed financial reforms that stimulated economic growth and turned loss 
into profit. It was eventually the combination of the crises on Java and the career making of Van den 
Bosch as an army general, successful colonial administrator and a social reformer that convinced King 
William I of the man’s vision.50 
Van den Bosch arrived on Java in early 1830, and immediately started making transformations to 
implement the cultivation system. The cultivation system was grafted on the idea of forced cultivation 
of cash crops by demanding 20% of the agricultural grounds to be used for plantation of coffee, sugar, 
tobacco, indigo and other cash crops. In addition, the Javanese peasants were expected to spend 66 
days of labour on herendiensten, construction and maintenance work in their region in service of their 
masters, to create the necessary infrastructure. Crucial for carrying out and managing the system were 
the regents, the local native provincial rulers, who received an additional reward depending on the 
amount and value of their lands’ yield. The local chiefs and population received plantloon, wages 
depending on the delivered quantity of cash crops. Automatically, local and regional heads were 
involved in the Dutch wage-system, laying hands on large percentages of production yields while 
putting heavy pressure on the population’s labour capacity.51 Effectively the system was grounded on 
forced labour, and the heavy burden of the herendiensten combined with the large impact of cash-
crop cultivation put increasing pressure on the Javanese peasant communities. 
Ideologically, Van den Bosch’ system was more than just one of taxation. It incorporated 
comprehensive thoughts on the design of the structures of the (colonial) Javanese society and the role 
of the regents. Because of the ‘deep reverence’ the regents enjoyed from the Javanese people, and to 
give the peasants the impression that they were still governed by their own rulers (although these 
were transformed into colonial agents), Van den Bosch thought it was absolutely crucial to preserve 
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the native administration as an institution.52 But since Van den Bosch did not believe in enlightening 
local populations with Western administrational ideas, he pleaded for a policy of abstinence: an 
administration that made use of the strong positions of the local rulers, and abstained from attempts 
in educating or ‘liberalizing’ the Javanese peasants. By placing the regents under the authority of the 
residents and rewarding the regents with a percentage of the profits, Van den Bosch incorporated the 
local rulers in the Dutch administrative system and gave them an interest in generating large profits. 
The deployment of this system compelled peasants to grow and deliver valuable cash crops for the 
government and secured large and constant supplies of these export goods from Java to the 
homeland.53 However, Van den Bosch never designed a clear, coherent outline of how to realize his 
plans: often he was confused about the best methods of realizing his ideas himself, and sometimes he 
changed his views about colonial matters. In order to safe his idea from liberal critics, he camouflaged 
rather than conveyed his ‘real intentions’ in his writings, making actual policymaking even more 
difficult for his inferiors.54 The thoughts of Van den Bosch, radical, often inconsistent and sometimes 
unclear, have generated a lot of attention and commentary, which has overshadowed opinions about 
Dutch colonialism in the 1830s. The cultivation system therefore was judged more often by the ideas 
and professions of its founder than its actual workings.55 But this was simply because the actual 
workings were way too varied to capture in a single critique. 
1.2 Moving beyond the cultivation system 
 
Not many subjects raised more political controversy in and after the nineteenth century than the 
cultivation system. Initially a debate between liberal and conservative parliamentarians in the 
nineteenth century, it focused on the problem of the formation of a state-monopoly on agricultural 
production. In the 1830s already, (ex-) colonial officials such later Governor-General Pieter Merkus 
(1787-1844, in office 1841-1844) criticized the system for its illiberalism, as the state held a monopoly 
on trade in all cash crops, and claimed that the financial results were very poor due to lack of 
knowledge, inefficiency and agricultural mismanagement by the local officials.56 The greatest eyesore 
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for Merkus and his allies was the monopoly the NHM, or Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij 
(Netherlands Trading Society, founded in 1825 by king William I), had on transporting colonial 
production to the homeland. The debate got an emotional twist when the first (ex-) colonial civil 
servants started publishing about their experiences in the colonies. Among the most troubling aspects 
were the knevelarijen or maltreatments of the local population by their own heads. This is exemplified 
by the observations of Inspector of Cultivations Louis Vitalis, who unexpectedly visited a plantation, 
and  saw “dozens of greybeards, all heads or members of the local board of the desa (village), who 
were tied up with both thumbs to a rope, which was thrown over the branch of a tree, so that the 
unfortunates were barely able to touch the ground with their toes”, simply because the regent was 
dissatisfied with production levels. In another district he found “village heads tied up completely naked 
on the ground, the arms bound crosswise, exposed to the burning heat of the sun, which also 
happened on orders of the regent.”57 
These kind of accounts were heard more and more during the nineteenth century, as politicians 
and scholars started to publish about the effects of the system. Former preacher Wolter van Hoëvell 
(1812-1879) took the lead in hammering on the indebtedness of the Netherlands to the ‘ignorant’ 
Javanese population in parliamentary debates.58 Eventually Multatuli’s famous Max Havelaar became 
the most important indictment to address the problems of Dutch colonial exploitation. The ‘moral’ 
argument has remained omnipresent in debates about the cultivation system up until today. Although 
the second half of the twentieth century saw a shift in historiography that dealt with the question of 
the impact of the system on the development of Java’s economic development, making a moral claim 
seems inescapable. Cees Fasseur, Robert Elson and Robert Van Niel have revised the classic view of 
Clifford Geertz’ “agricultural involution.” Geertz claimed that the cultivation system structured Java 
into stagnation and dependence and blocked local, rural economic development on Java, but the 
accounts of Fasseur, Van Neil and Elson proved otherwise.59 Still, Jan Breman was eager to accuse 
those authors of ignoring “the darker side of the coin.” Essentially he used new research- data to repeat 
the arguments of classic authors and nineteenth-century liberal Dutch politicians or former colonial 
bureaucrats and modern authors like Geertz, grafted on the moral rejection of forced labour used to 
prove the negative impact of colonial cash-crop production on Java.60 The debate on the cultivation 
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system has therefore been rather repetitive, overshadowing the importance of the principles of the 
dual system and colonial rule. The case of the impact of the system on Java has extensively been dealt 
with, as have Van den Bosch’ views. But since these views rarely reached down to the daily reality of 
the residents, more emphasis should be put on the actual practice of the system. Technically, Van den 
Bosch and his successor Jean Chrétien Baud (1789-1859, in office 1833–1836) created a system of 
forced cultivation during the 1830s, but, as I will show, the interpretation and implementation of Van 
den Bosch’ plans depended on the pragmatism of the residents and the regents. That explains the 
regional differences in the adaptation of the system on Java, and the importance of studying these 
contacts. 
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2. Sources of authority 
 
The dual system as designed by Van den Bosch was grafted on interaction between Dutch officials and 
Javanese nobles. Both parties were used to different types of rule, governance and state-formation. 
To understand governance in the 1830s, it is important to learn about governance prior to these years. 
This chapter seeks to discover the outlines Javanese and Dutch ideas about statecraft in order to frame 
the possible modalities for cooperation in the nineteenth century. To determine specific 
characterizations of state formation, Max Weber’s three different types of authority prove very useful. 
His principles of rational and traditional authority have been used extensively to explain Western and 
Javanese ideas about statecraft. Evidently, ideas about power and authority are changeable and 
dynamic. In medieval Europe, the idea of power was obviously not the same as in Europe of the 1800s, 
just as pre-Islamized Java had different power concepts than Java in 1800, even without considering 
wide regional and local differences. The abstractions I make however are as I hope to show applicable 
to the Javanese state and the Dutch state around 1800, so prior to the introduction of the Cultivation 
system. From then onward, due to mutual influence of Dutch and Javanese authorities on Java, 
exercise of governance becomes too complicated to use these strictly demarcated types of authority 
separately. 
2.1 Modes of authority 
 
Weber distinguished three ideal types of authority: traditional, charismatic and legal (or rational) 
authority. A ruler who holds traditional authority is obeyed because of his traditional status, based on 
the sanctity of age-old rules and powers. Charismatic authority is based on the specific characteristics 
of an individual. Legal authority is supported by rational grounds, resting on a belief in the legality of 
enacted rules.61 This division provides a simplified, yet somewhat abstracted classification that does 
not always project reality but can clearly distinguish the values of native Javanese rulers from the 
values of Dutch officials. Weber is useful here because the idea of a traditional ruler applies very well 
to the actual reality of statecraft on Java. 
It is safe to say that most traditional rulers hold supernaturally legitimized authority. On Java, this 
supernatural power is known as kesekten, the indicator of the inherent quality of persons and things 
able to exercise power over their environment.62 A traditional Javanese king, as explained by 
Soemarsaid Moertono, was an exponent of a micro-cosmos, which was the Javanese interpretation of 
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the half of the cosmos that belonged to ‘the world of man’, whereas the other half, the macro-cosmos, 
belonged to ‘the supra-human world.’63 Ceremonies and symbolism were of essential importance in 
order to mobilize this power. As exemplified by Benedict Anderson kings on Java rather focused on 
accumulation, concentration, and preservation of power than its actual use.64 Powerful, regal titles 
such as Susuhunan and Panembahan (considered powerful because they were used by the Wali Sanga, 
the legendary prophets who spread Islam on Java), and names of powerful ancestors provided in clear-
cut means to enhance the prestige of a ruler.65 A Javanese ruler would also concentrate around him 
so-called pusaka: all kinds of regalia that a ruler usually inherited from his predecessors and that were 
believed to contain unusual amounts of supernatural power. The most famous example is the kris (a 
traditional Javanese dagger), but other weapons, payongs (traditional parasols that throughout the 
archipelago showed off power depending on its size and colour), sacred musical instruments, and even 
extraordinary human beings, such as albinos, dwarfs or fortune-tellers could also function as pusaka. 
Being heirlooms, pusaka emphasized the continuity of the strength of a ruling dynasty. The loss of 
pusaka was interpreted as a sign of the impending collapse of the dynasty, while adding new pusaka 
would have the opposite effect.66 As I will show in chapter three and four, use of pusaka remained 
important during the colonial era. 
In practice, the concentration of power on a ruler was usually interpreted via expressions of 
welfare, fertility, prosperity, glory, and stability. The moment these signs diminished under influence 
of certain manifestations of disorder such as natural disasters or wars, thefts, murders and greed 
would be interpreted as diffusion of the ruler’s power and strength.67 Accumulation of power was 
possible by, for example, expressing strict asceticism, which means making use of the ability to 
concentrate or focus on one’s inner power to absorb power from the outside in different forms 
including fasting, going without sleep, meditation, sexual abstinence, ritual purification, and various 
types of sacrifices.68 Absorbing outward power is an important element in expressions of Javanese 
culture such as wayang: usually two contrasting iconographic opponents, such as good and evil or male 
and female show interaction, and overcoming the differences of these opponents leads to growth of 
power. Rulers therefore regularly used the ability to contain or control opposites in their claims to 
power.69 
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As stressed by Anderson, the above-described conception presumes power is concrete rather 
than abstract, an “intangible, mysterious, and divine energy which animates the universe,” and that 
there is a vast and constant amount of power in the universe.70 In the Javanese concept, power is 
homogenous rather than heterogeneous; all power relations are of the same kind or shape, and power 
does not raise the question of legitimacy. Since there is a fixed amount of power that is “derived from 
a single homogenous source, power itself antecedes questions of good and evil, and therefore it would 
be meaningless to the Javanese way of thinking to claim the right to rule on the basis of differential 
sources of power.”71 
The culture and philosophy of enlightenment have had a great impact on the feudalized forms of 
power as it had existed in pre-modern Europe. A new political culture of change in ideas about power 
and rule expressed itself during and following the American and French, and industrial revolutions. 
Anderson adequately contrasts Javanese concepts of power with nineteenth-century West-European 
ones. In post-enlightenment Europe, power became an abstract concept that strictly speaking does 
not exist. It became a formula to indicate certain patterns of social interaction, commonly used to 
describe relationships.72 In this concept, power’s sources are heterogeneous, meaning it is not derived 
from a ‘supernatural’ source in a ‘macro-cosmos’, but rather acquired via social-skills or status, wealth, 
organizations, weapons and so forth. In addition, accumulation of power is not limited, since it is not, 
as in the Javanese concept, defined as a constant and limited source. Finally, power is morally 
ambiguous, which follows from the secular conception of power as a relationship between human 
beings.73 It is more of a social contract than a force solemnly received by a ruler. The difference with 
kesekten is that in Europe people started to play an active role in the concept of power, showing strong 
interaction with their ruler, while on Java power ‘worked’ in just one direction: from the ruler down to 
the people. Only a reduction of population could affect a ruler’s power. 
As mentioned, these changes in power-concepts were still in progress in the era this thesis deals 
with. Eventually, the above-described changes motivated the process Weber called modernization. 
The modernized Western world of the early twentieth century according to Weber rested on 
mechanical rather than spiritual foundations, in which cultural values are constrained by the ‘iron cage’ 
of material goods and acquisitiveness.74 This new socio-cultural situation brought along several 
overlapping tensions between the “moral or spiritual order and the material order and between 
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aesthetic culture and social modernity.”75 The process of rationalization can explain these tensions. 
Rationalization represents itself as an intellectualization of abstract cognitive processes, in amongst 
others knowledge and observation, commodification, standardization and in terms of efficiency, 
legislative administrative procedures and bureaucratization.76 Rationalization is a significant 
contributor to what is called ‘disenchantment’, explained by Weber as the loss of a sacred sense of 
wholeness and the connection between self and the world by magic, sacred traditions, holiness, 
religion in general and myths.77 Eventually disenchantment contributes to rationalization as well, as it 
makes the world less mysterious, and reshapes the manner in which objective knowledge can be 
interpreted. It secularizes the world on the one hand, and increases the scale, scope and power of 
science, the law, bureaucracy, and so forth on the other, adding increasingly to the westernization of 
local elites as mentioned in the introduction and described by Sutherland.78 Prior to 1830, Java had not 
known such as process of disenchantment yet, which explains the difference between Javanese and 
European power-concepts. 
2.2 Differences in statecraft 
 
The traditional Javanese state: patrimonial monarchies 
The relevance of Weber’s ideal types becomes clearer when studying Javanese and European 
statecraft. For traditional rulers, family-relations played a crucial role. When these family members or 
the household of rulers started to dominate the states’ administration, Weber speaks of 
patrimonialism. A patrimonial ruler remains in power by making sure all important offices are hold by 
family members, and ties with officials are of personal nature. As shown by various scholars, such as 
Schrieke, Bakker, Sartono Kartodirdjo and Moertono, Javanese kingdoms had a clear patrimonial 
design. Schrieke’s work is particularly interesting, as he was a colonial official himself for many years 
and later became one of the most renowned Dutch scholars in Indology. Bakker’s theoretical but useful 
outline provides in a close reading and explanation of Weber’s long, thorough conceptualization. 
According to Bakker patrimonialism as an ideal type is “relatively unknown”, and therefore he 
establishes six major characteristics himself, that are summarized below: 
1. Authority is vested in the hands of one central ruler (or a small oligarchy with one man as 
head). The chief ruler makes most major decisions, holds all state power and is in the ultimate 
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position of authority. There is no separate body of independently powerful landholders who 
challenges the rulers authority (without causing major disruption of state organizational 
structure), and all land is owned by the ruler. 
2. All control of labour and land is centred on the patrimonial ruler and court, so all economically 
significant property is the ruler’s patrimony, or treated as such.  
3. Consequently, there is no separate independent body of powerful landholders. All aristocracy 
is tied to the ruler’s court, while its members are dependent officials tied to the state 
apparatus. 
4. Everyone in the state is liable to the patrimonial ruler, based on membership of some group. 
Farmers pay tax not individually but as members of a community, while the aristocrats collect 
tax for the patrimonial ruler and not for themselves or on their own authority. 
5. There are no political rights for the population or any individual based on a legal-rational sense; 
rights are based on ‘tradition’, of which the limits cannot be exceeded easily by either the 
patrimonial ruler or his subjects. 
6. No group of individuals has any economic property rights in a capitalistic sense: the 
patrimonial ruler is the only owner of property of which the rights are based on his tradition 
and discretion.79 
Note that this situation is profoundly different from feudalism. As stressed by Furnivall, on Java 
people were of greater importance than land. In feudal Europe a man was liable to service because he 
held land, but in Java a man held land because he was liable to service.80 According to Weber, 
patrimonial authority is an outgrowth of patriarchal authority within the extended kin household, 
where the patrimonial ruler is not merely a patriarch.81 This means the family of the patron forms the 
most important authoritarian body after the patron himself. Bakker has pointed out the significance 
of patrimonial rule successfully, but he focused specifically on aspects of production and property-
rights. I will attempt to show that the patrimonial system applies to Java in terms of politics and 
statecraft as well. 
According to Schrieke, the central government of precolonial Javanese kingdoms was essentially 
an extension of the ruler’s personal household and staff, in which officials were granted their positions 
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and the perquisites that go with them as personal favours of the ruler.82 So the king’s aristocracy 
consisted of relatives and family-members, whose rank and position was determined by their distance 
in kinship from the king. The closer to the king a noble stood in kinship, the more powerful he was. 
Family members were therefore the closest advisors of the king, and had profound influence on state 
policy.83 Functionaries in the royal administration who had strong ties to the royal family, preferably 
in kinship, occupied the highest ranks in the military and clergy and were called mantri’s.84 While the 
royal family used powerful, royal titles, these mantri’s used specific administrative titles (as displayed 
in appendix one).85 Together they formed the administrative elite in an enclosed group, clearly 
demarcated from the commoners as a ruling class: the priyayi. Its members carefully preserved this 
distinction.86 As pointed out by Sutherland and Kartodirdjo, this gap grew under the influence of Dutch 
presence.87  
Apart from the internal, the external court relations of Javanese kingdoms were of a patrimonial 
kind as well. As Merle Ricklefs explains, “the physical isolation of populated territories and poor 
communications on Java strengthened the difficulty of maintaining centralized authority.”88 When a 
king’s empire grew in size, these “perennial difficulties” could really problematize maintaining tight 
administrative control in the peripheral areas.89 As a result, a local “ministerialis assigned to govern 
some remote province” could easily ignore central authority and develop his own political ambitions.90 
This is what had happened for example at the end of the fifteenth century when the suzerainty of the 
empire of Majapahit weakened and the rulers of Demak and Gresik declared their independence and 
established their own kingdoms.91 
Here we touch upon Anderson’s famous ‘beam of light analogy.’ Anderson depicts the expression 
of power by a Javanese ruler as a cone of light, plugged into the socket of the macro-cosmos and 
spreading its light all over the patrimonial state. The strength of the light is influenced by the ruler’s 
personal abilities and concentration or asceticism (though there is, as mentioned, a fixed amount of 
‘light’ or power), while the lights diminishing radiance, a consequence of  to the increasing distance 
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from the bulb, is Anderson’s apt metaphor for the ruler’s power in his court and periphery. Simply put: 
the physical distance from the court determined the strength of the ruler’s power in a certain area.92 
Therefore, the traditional Javanese state was defined by its centre, not its periphery. Borders did not 
matter in Javanese political thought, but the capital of the realm did. 
Anderson’s metaphor helps us to explain what Moertono’s calls the mandala-system. The 
mandala was a geopolitical, overarching structure of precolonial inner-kingdom relations, relating to 
boundaries and to contact with foreign states. In a mandala, a central ruler resided at the court and 
ruled directly over the negara agung (the core regions or crown domain). The mancanegara (outer 
territories or peripheries) within the Mandala were not under direct administrative control of the 
central ruler, as the ties with the relatively autonomous leaders or overlords in the periphery (the 
Bupati), and the central emperor in the capital were patrimonial. As Anderson points out, the rulers in 
the mandala and the central ruler were a priori each other’s enemies.93 In most Malayan kingdoms, 
“the king’s dignity was given public recognition in the behaviour of great chiefs towards him in the 
political ceremonies in which the unity of the state was revalidated, and yet the chiefs lived in hostility 
with the sultan and had little to do with him except in consultation and co-operation to preserve the 
state in its external relations, including its defence.”94 Since power in the Javanese concept had a 
limited and constant quantity, an increase in power in one place meant an equivalent diminution 
elsewhere; therefore the division of power on Java within Moertono’s mandala-system would always 
be interpreted as logical and universal.95 In the words of Moertono “the doctrine emphasized the cult 
of expansion, a necessary spur to the struggle for existence, self-assertion and world domination, and 
the dynamic factor calculated to disturb the equilibrium of inter-state relations.”96 Hence, the logical 
result of ideal of inter-mandala relationships was a unity of all political entities where the ebb and flow 
of power seized because it had found its balance.97 
In practice this unity was never reached. The early Buddhist and Hindu kingdoms on Java prior to 
the arrival of European powers were primarily inland states (with exception of Majapahit and Demak), 
where, as mentioned, it was difficult to maintain centralized authority.98 The solution for controlling 
the large, mountainous areas was found in a system of a pseudo-feudalized form of rule, with 
considerable power granted to vassal lords.99 The most powerful kings stood at the top of a large 
mandala-based empire and functioned as the central authority in almost every aspect of life, as 
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explained by balancing and manipulating the interests of those below him by appearing to have 
supernatural support.100 He would also try to impel neighbouring rulers to submit to his authority, 
especially those who possessed a large population and were able to attract local as well as foreign 
traders.101 Constant competition among Javanese rulers to become the pre-eminent overlord was thus 
not uncommon, and Javanese kingdoms were often based on conquest, diplomacy, and formation of 
coalitions.102 
The Javanese empire of Mataram is a good example. Founded and expanded by continuous 
conquests and diplomacy and ruled feudally by a traditional monarch, Mataram became the 
preeminent power on Java in the seventeenth century.103 Coastal regents were required to pay 
homage to the Susuhunan, and those regents the Susuhunan considered uncooperative risked being 
put to death.104 Although Clive Day calls these regents “nearly sovereign (…) independent kings”, 
Schrieke stresses the process of binding between the Susuhunans and regents, as the Susuhunans 
would attempt to keep the regents close to the court by, for example, using marriage policy, or 
replaced them in order to terminate any aspirations to independence and keep their land in his ‘cone 
of light.’105 In the words of Gregory Moedjanto, the power of the kings of Mataram was eventually so 
great in their subjects’ points of view, “that they were often described as the owners of everything in 
the world; not only the owners of a country or of property, but also the owners of one’s very life.”106 
In summary, Java never had absolutist monarchs but patrons. They were rulers who held an 
administration of essentially a hierarchical line of separate, self-sufficient, and highly autonomous 
units of power, vertically linked by the personal ties between power-holders.107 The Javanese state 
was therefore organized around the central ruler’s ability to accumulate, withhold, and express power, 
and as long as he could maintain this ability, the beam of the bulb of light would spread out over his 
realm, supported by the sub-autonomous regents in the periphery. 
The nineteenth century colonial state: bureaucratic governance 
That Weber’s theoretical outlines describe a process rather than a status quo is unsurprising. European 
rule over the dominions overseas was obviously designed in accordance with European ideas about 
statecraft, but the practice of rational authority in what Weber called the ‘bureaucratic state’ remains 
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difficult to investigate, as just as “historically there has been a purely patrimonial state” (as Weber 
remarked), there has never been a purely bureaucratic state.108 Still, it is interesting to compare the 
process of the colonial state-formation on Java in the first three decades of the nineteenth century 
with Weber’s conceptualization, as it clearly shows that maintaining central rule was likely more 
difficult than the Governor-Generals expected. 
Pre-nineteenth century European states had limited ability to impose its schemes on society. In 
the words of James Scott: “The eighteenth-century European state was still largely a machine for 
extraction. (…) State officials lacked the consistent coercive power and the fine-grained administrative 
grid, or the detailed knowledge that would have permitted them to undertake more intrusive 
experiments in social engineering.”109 The conditions to construct states machineries to undertake 
these experiments were being met during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to Scott, 
three elements found these developments: (1) the aspiration to administrate nature and society, 
which he calls “high modernism”, (2) the unrestrained use of modern states’ power to achieve these 
designs, and (3) a weakened or prostrate civil society that lacks capacity to resist these plans.110 In the 
post-Napoleonic Netherlands, political struggles under William I and II (exemplified by the Belgian 
Revolution and the continuous degradation of the kings power, certainly after the Dutch constitutional 
reform of 1848), suggest that the developments of state-formation, in accordance with these three 
elements, happened in a somewhat faltering manner. Elements such as a strong, wealthy citizenry 
kept the king’s power in balance. However, on Java the colonial government experienced a strong 
growth of power from 1800 onward. After the Java War, Dutch governance became much more stable 
and undisputed, as native Javanese heads rather cooperated with than resisted the Dutch. Moreover, 
the cultivation system reveals the exact strive for ordering nature and society Scott defines.  
In the minds of Raffles, Van den Bosch and other colonial officials the ‘empty grounds’ of the 
colonies provided in the ideal platform to induce state formation and create society to their own 
likings. Their ideas are a very clear output of the administrative aspirations described by Scott. Perhaps 
we could even say that in the East, these aspirations were even more easily distributed than in Europe, 
when we take into account the gradual Dutch expansion and the consolidation of Dutch rule from 1815 
to 1830 on Java. During these years, increasing scientific interest and research, governmental 
institutionalization and economic expansion are three basic processes that illustrate the expression of 
Scott’s ‘high modernism’ on Java. 
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At the beginning of the nineteenth century administrative organizations grew enormously in size 
and in importance in European states, due to the emergence of a of new political order and a range of 
economic and social changes, such as technological and industrial developments, population growth 
and of course the tarnishing of ancien-régime politics.111 The consolidation of numerous more or less 
independent political units in 1500 into twenty-odd states in 1900 marked the unification of Europe in 
nation-states that centred themselves around a capital. Huge and centralized administrative structures 
could not develop in the absence of a powerful centre. The centre, especially in culturally 
heterogeneous communities with specific historical traditions, relied in such structures, to subdue and 
replace provincial power holders, establish central authority and collect taxes.112 After the Napoleonic 
Wars, the creation of the Kingdom of Netherlands as a buffer-state against France marked this type of 
centralization. Being a kingdom, one could easily think the political situation in the Netherlands was 
not that different from the Javanese: power was in hands of an aristocracy, commonly shared via 
patrimonial relations. The difference lies in Weber’s disenchantment. The separation of state and 
church, the protestant character of the dominant part of Dutch society and the altering position and 
political role of the king had growing influence on the Dutch political landscape. The Dutch bourgeoisie 
in the cities had always enjoyed high social positions, comparable to the landholding nobilities. 
Moreover, the Netherlands became increasingly institutionalized, and as the balance of power in 
Europe kept the country away from the immediate threat of war, the ‘mercantile spirit’ of the Dutch 
resurrected, giving the growth of the Dutch urban bourgeoisie a major impulse. The position and role 
of the king changed drastically. Whereas the stadtholders of the Dutch Republic and their families took 
part in warfare, international political disputes and power plays, king William I spend most of time 
reading and signing reports, minutes, bills and statutes and was under constant administrative 
pressure.113 The Dutch king had become an official himself, whereas a Javanese regent would leave all 
his administrative duties to his patih, his chief minister. The Javanese kingdom remained traditional, 
while the Dutch state, especially in comparison to the Javanese one, was slowly transforming into a 
bureaucratic state. 
The process of disenchantment and rationalization are the key concepts that led to the formation 
of bureaucratic states. Based on early liberal thought about authority and bureaucracy of authors like 
John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, Weber defines six major characters that are recognizable today 
in modern bureaucracies. In sum, a bureaucracy should be (1) managed by rules, (2) formed by a 
hierarchical construction, (3) strictly separated from personal interests, (4) conducted on the base of 
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written documents, and (5) bureaucratic work should be done by qualified persons, who (6) are 
appointed only because of their technical qualities.114 Obviously, in the ideal bureaucratic state, 
rational, professional, and technical bureaucratic governance rejects the practice of patrimonialism, 
nepotism or rule by any kind of nobility or aristocracy. The personal relations the kings in the Javanese 
mandala enjoyed with their regents are incompatible with strict Weberian bureaucracy. According to 
Weber under the influence of Protestantism people were stimulated to find a clear and uniform goal, 
shaped into a vocation. Though this is not an undisputed argument, Weber does show that there was 
a stimulus in Northern European countries during the nineteenth century that created the 
Berufsmensch, a man of vocation that methodologically sought fulfilment and identity in his 
profession.115 The official, whether he is a clerk or an army officer, needs to see his vocation as his 
Pflicht or duty. This means the holding of an office should not be exploited for rents or emoluments in 
exchange for the rendering of certain services, but an acceptance of the duty to serve not a person but 
a community, and thus fulfil an impersonal and functional purpose.116 Salary or raises should not be 
the (only) motivation for doing a job well; the self-discipline within the concept of vocation is 
considered more important. These requirements were difficult to reach in the early nineteenth century 
in general, but certainly on Java. Any pure type of bureaucracy was never realized due to all kinds of 
corruption, nepotism, and other kinds of ‘non-bureaucratic’ behaviour. But the strivings of men like 
Raffles and Van den Bosch do capture the same spirit that is apparent in Weber; a strong, professional 
will and a motivation to change and reshape society according to their ideals. Highly enthusiastic 
themselves, men like Raffles and Van den Bosch expected the same motivation from their subordinate 
officials, but as I will show in the next chapters, this expectation was rather vain. 
A closer look at the European presence in Asia in this era of ‘high modernization’ shows increasing 
interest of European officials in shaping society. For instance, British rule in India under governance of 
Lord William Bentinck (1774-1839, in office 1828-1835), increasingly impregnated the indigenous roots 
it was initially based on. Inspired by liberal and utilitarian doctrines Bentinck reformed the colonial 
administration, tax-system, army, and implemented education laws to propagate western education 
and tutor the Indian population.117 Under Daendels and Raffles Java was subjected to visions that fit in 
this tradition. Both tried to create an overseas version of European order and rule, as they planned an 
institutionalized colony based on educated elites (see below). However, in Van den Bosch’ perception 
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the task of the colonial state was to develop profitable export-production to support the economy of 
the mother country. The plans of the Governors of 1808-1830 largely remained plans and never had 
the chance to develop, as sooner or later a new Governor-General would take over and execute his 
own plans. Van den Bosch considered Java completely subordinate to the home country and wanted 
to keep the size of Dutch territory, in the aftermath of the Java War, limited.118 As the European-styled 
modernization of Java continued, Van den Bosch’ motives were focussed more on the homeland than 
the colony. He considered the forceful, experimental changes of Daendels, Raffles, and Van der 
Capellen the cause of the Java War, and for this reason he favoured his personal version of indirect 
control by integrating the regents into the Dutch administration.119  
According to Van den Doel, the process of colonial state-formation did not differ that much from 
developments in the West. Following Joseph à Campo and Houben he defines the process as “the 
establishment and reinforcement of factual sovereignty and effectual rule over a clearly delimited 
territory and the creation of bodies that improve contact between state and people by a foreign power, 
without nullifying the power and influence of this foreign power.”120 À Campo also sees “eventual 
independence” (on the very long term) as its goal combined with a “larger degree of legal and political 
equality,” but this relates more to the effective ideological expression of the ethical policy of late 
nineteenth century than to the doctrine of the cultivation system.121 The core of the colonial 
administration and methods as proposed by Van den Bosch followed the same principles Weber 
idealized, but in a strict European sense, which meant Javanese servants (usually those of mixed 
European and Javanese blood) were only allowed to work at the bottom of the administrative 
apparatus.  
Summarizing, we can see some major differences between state concepts of Europe and Java 
when we take Anderson’s, Van den Doel’s and À Campo’s observations into account. In contrast to the 
Javanese state, the Western state tended focus on its borders rather than its centre; the demarcation 
of the territory defined the area of the state. Instead of the bulb of light’s diminishing radiation, the 
whole state was to be under the same amount of power, no matter how far from the centre. Second, 
legal rule, under influence of disenchantment, denounced the use of personal, patrimonial relations: 
there was simply no place for anything but professionalism in the ideal Western bureaucratic system. 
We will have a closer look at the historical context of the VOC’s and its successors’ policy to show that 
this ideal was never reached. 
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2.3 The base for cooperation 
 
Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the VOC had become increasingly 
involved in political games all over the Indonesian archipelago. The Company defended alliances with 
Javanese nobles, who “hated each other more than they hated any foreigners”, and got dragged into 
Javanese affairs by “opportunistic requests for support in civil conflicts.122 Finally, “a stable equilibrium 
was reached in which the Dutch found themselves playing what Ricklefs calls a ‘mediatory role’ as 
‘ultimate arbiters of insoluble disputes.’”123 Using diplomacy, intrigues and – only when unavoidable – 
military action, the VOC used local chiefs as its agents to expand its commercial and social influence 
over Java, the archipelago, and other parts of South,- East-, and Southeast Asia.124 The VOC never 
became the overall dominator on Java, but in those areas where it became most heavily involved (like 
the Pasisir ports and the coffee producing Priangan), its political impact was considerable. 
Economically the Company stimulated production while politically it mingled in the Javanese tradition 
of “weaker kingdoms dependent on the goodwill of peripheral elite, to be overthrown by a usurper.”125 
Collecting vassals all over Java, the VOC became a major player in several mandala systems, although 
it was never able to ‘police’ the whole island. Effectively, nor the VOC nor the Javanese aristocrats had 
a clear vision or policy for Java: politics determined policies and persons were of greater importance 
than these policies.126 Still, the Indonesian states acknowledged the growing Dutch naval supremacy 
and were eager to determine their diplomatic relations with other states based on their relation with 
the VOC, for example in exchange for Dutch protection.127 The VOC awarded titles and ranks, as the 
Dutch styled themselves as prominent representatives of ‘the supreme Dutch king in Holland.’ This 
was eagerly adopted by the Javanese regents by expressing the superiority of the Government-General 
in kinship terms (as was custom in Javanese nobility), by calling him eyang (grandfather), while the 
Javanese ruler was called wayah (grandson). By doing so, the Dutch let the regents interpret their own 
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historical explanation of the Dutch legitimation of rule.128 Similarly, from the 1830s onward, the Dutch 
represented the relationship between resident and regent as one between an elder and a younger 
brother. 
Daendels’ and Raffles’ administrations both instigated a wave of institutionalization and 
bureaucratization. The exercise of control was reformed directly by dividing Java in 5 prefectures and 
30 regencies and centralized by putting all officials under direct control of Batavia where the two major 
bodies of the central administration, the Gouvernement Generaal and Gouvernements Secretarie, were 
founded. In 1819 these bodies were merged together into the centralized Algemene Secretarie 
(General Secretariat), under the Algemeen Secretaris.129 The system of corrupted VOC-officials was 
disposed of and forcefully replaced by a modernized bureaucratic administration. Daendels split up 
the island’s government into a ‘European’ and a ‘Native’ part, the Binnenlands and Inlands Bestuur. 
Under Daendels, every residency was put under control of a resident, and three years later Raffles 
introduced the position of assistant-resident.130 The assistant-residents were assisted by controleurs, 
each responsible for a number of districts within the regency.131 Every civil servant received a strictly 
demarcated function and a constant payment, as an attempt to replace the corrupted governance of 
the VOC and the traditional rule of the regents by rule of law.132 
Daendels’ forceful style towards the regents aimed at centralization of Java was not very 
conducive for the relation between the Dutch and Javanese rulers.133 Known as the ‘thundering 
marshal’, he must have left quite an impression on the princes and sultans of the ancient realms, who 
were used to much more delicate forms of communication. Raffles did not want to do business with 
the regents at all: he believed a system of landrent, imposed directly on the village chiefs, would 
stimulate direct contact between the government and the people, about which he had a much more 
positive opinion than the Dutch.134 Raffles preferred direct control of Java under European rule, and 
was determined to reduce the influence of the regents, whom he considered lazy, spoiled, elitist, and 
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less incapable of controlling territorial domain than the village chiefs.135 Van der Capellen continued 
this policy, this time with ethically driven motivations to protect the rights of the Javanese villagers.136 
This wave of institutionalization reformed Java into an increasingly bureaucratic unity. However, 
the arrival of Van den Bosch after the Java War marked a return to more conservative, commercially 
driven policy. Van den Bosch enforced the position of the regents by making their position hereditary, 
but this practice knew many regional varieties and this inducement remained informal: when the 
Javanese custom of hereditary succession threatened the state’s interests the promise of 
hereditariness was easily broken.137 But Van den Bosch’ ideology gave the regents much more political 
freedom, which strengthened their power and greatly enhanced the approachability of the provincial 
courts, enabling the residents to come in contact with regents more easily. By formalizing these kinds 
of Javanese principles according to Dutch law, the cultivation system legalized the basic realities of 
“Javanese morality” into “statutes”, as already observed by Multatuli.138 By guarding instead of 
affecting the prestige of the regents, Van den Bosch’ policy made use of, instead of denying the 
traditional authority of the regents. 
The reforms of Daendels and Raffles never really changed the malfunctions in bureaucratic 
practice (such as corruption) on higher level. Moreover, as I will elaborate on in the next chapter, the 
level of professionalism of civil servants during the 1820s was very low, and it was not until 1842 that 
laws obligated education and appointment of civil servants based on qualities rather than patronage 
or corruption.139 Up until then, patronage among civil servants and their superiors, surprisingly similar 
to the Javanese use, was a common phenomenon in the Dutch bureaucracy.140 The residents and their 
officials of the 1830s were half-heartedly educated and only partially the ideal civil servants of Weber. 
While the basic Weberian framework of bureaucratic, institutionalized administration was already 
there, the men of vocation that should have signified the system were still largely absent. It is for this 
reason that Van Niel called the civil administration and governance in the East Indies a “system of men 
rather than laws.”141 The individualistic character of the administration in which residents functioned 
stimulated wide personal latitude in interpreting and applying the principles of the cultivation system 
and rules and regulations.142 Van Niel describes the civil administration as paternalistic, liberal, 
autocratic and vague; especially the orders from the Government-General to the residents were vague 
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and most resident carried on their work according to their own understanding.143 These residents lived 
in a “native” environment, i.e. in a big house “in the countryside”, not rarely with one or more Javanese 
(or other native) women, surrounded by natives and supported by an extensive household with native 
servants, contrary to the civil servants in Batavia and Buitenzorg, who lived in a European colonial, 
Dutch environment.144 As Van den Doel noted, for the average resident on Java his demanding function 
was not just a job or position, but a lifestyle.145 So the residents and their staff, probably especially in 
the residencies further away from Batavia, were in closer contact with the regents and other local 
chiefs than with the Government-General. The colonial transformation of the priyayi elite as pointed 
out by Sutherland thus cannot be seen separately from the influence of the priyayi on European 
controllers.146 
This is very interesting: in the ideal of the European governors of the early nineteenth century, 
Java needed to be reigned centrally, under the modernizing influence of bureaucratization and 
institutionalization, countering the authentic Javanese political order, but practically these governors 
encountered the same difficulties as the Javanese kings. The radial distance between the king and 
regent in the mandala is comparable to the increasing gap between the Government-General and the 
residents in the early colonial state. The residents were thus, just like the regents, cut-off from their 
immediate relation with the Government-General. The regents, who in general already enjoyed a high 
level of autonomy in the mandala-system, in fact became independent actors under the European 
bureaucratic administration, stimulated by the return to traditionalism of Van den Bosch after the 
reforms of Daendels, Raffles and Van der Capellen had sidelined them. 
This policy was hard to continue regionally, since the level of professionalism and modernity of 
the residents was not very high. So the above described similarities in the relations between regents 
and residents can only be explained when we take into account that because of the turn in policy of 
Van den Bosch the regents were stimulated to use traditional authority. The residents and regents, 
both locally settled and much further away from the central government than intended, were forced 
into a system of cooperation. The regents had been sidelined for more than a quarter of a century and 
gladly took part, and so the Daendels-Raffels reforms had indirectly stimulated their willingness to 
cooperate. It is crucial now to find out how residents and regents cooperated, and identify the 
connection between both by looking at mutual correspondence. Here we can find the crucial link in 
the establishment of colonial control. 
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3. Knowledge for power: the settlement of a symbiotic relation 
 
The introduction of the cultivation system reset the relation between the Javanese heads and western 
officials. The residents became the spearhead of colonial rule, replacing the ancient political system of 
ruler-centred states. The position of resident grew from trading company representative to the highest 
political authority in the region. In every residency, the resident had the overall responsibility for 
generating agricultural profit, which could only be achieved by employing the native aristocracy and 
population. Sufficient provision of information about and a good relation with the local aristocracy was 
therefore of essential importance. Naturally, the regents never spared any effort in trying to profit 
from their renewed, enforced positions. In this chapter I will display the techniques and strategies used 
by both the residents and regents to cooperate and compete. The archival material from the 1830s 
shows us a diverse, complex and paradoxical, yet also intriguing and peculiar kind of relationship that 
contributes to rather than refutes the conception of colonial rule as a ‘system of men.’ 
Correspondence and reports about immediate contact between Dutch officials and native chiefs 
found in the ANRI sheds new light on the complex relation between ‘colonizer’ and ‘colonized’, 
showing that the former was not always in the lead. If we want to find out how both parties cooperated 
in the system of dual control, this kind of archival material is our closest and most complete source of 
information. As mentioned in the introduction, most material was mainly collected out of 
opportunistic motivations. By sifting the archival material, specifically interesting cases showed up. In 
this chapter most of these cases come from the local archives of Semarang and Surakarta. The archives 
of Semarang contain particularly interesting correspondence with the regent of Grobogan (see map 
5). Its revealing letters tell us much about the relation between the residents of Semarang and this 
regent. Semarang was of great importance for rice-cultivation and the production of timber, while cash 
crops such as sugar, coffee and tobacco were of lesser importance.147 The city of Semarang had been 
in the hands of the Dutch since 1678 and had become an important colonial trading centre. 
Very interesting as well are the relations with various regents around the courts of Surakarta and 
Yogyakarta. As principalities, these residencies enjoyed a high level of autonomy, although in practice 
they were subjected to the Dutch supreme sovereignty. An interesting example is the position of one 
of the minor principalities called Mangkunegara, a vassal state of Surakarta (see map 4). The rulers of 
this state became the closest allies of the Dutch in the entire region. A specific case about throne-
succession in Surakarta has been described by Vincent Houben, who uses archival material from the 
National Archives in The Hague (which largely consists of copies of material in the ANRI). Detailed files 
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in the ANRI and a reinterpretation of letters from Van den Bosch to Baud give us a clearer view on the 
Dutch’ perception of their own relations with the noble courts in the principalities. 
3.1 The information network 
 
As a consequence of the reforms of Van der Capellen and Van den Bosch, the job of resident became 
partly administrative and partly diplomatic. Though most residents considered themselves 
representatives of the Dutch Government in the first place, and administrator (in a sense that they 
could intervene in matters of police and jurisdiction), in the second, some residents in the 1830s still 
complained about having only “moral influence” and merely being able to “guide and reprimand” the 
regents.148 Overall, the residents depended on their ability to win over the cooperation of senior native 
officials.149 The regents on the other hand were becoming part of an administrative body that needed 
their prestige in order to carry out influence successfully. The Dutch promise of profit shares, prestige 
and consolidation of power interwove the regents tightly with the Dutch administration.150 In order to 
be able to realize cooperation, both the residents and regents needed reliable intelligence about each 
other. Knowledge was power, so this paragraph peruses the colonial intelligence network and the 
techniques used in the colonial system of careful acquirement, preservation and distribution of 
information. 
First, let us take a look at what has already been written about colonial intelligence gathering. The 
colonial information network of nineteenth century British-India has been thoroughly researched and 
provides foothold in grasping the importance of colonial knowledge. Christopher Baily concluded that 
the British had to overcome many difficulties to penetrate into the already existent but rather 
decentralized and oral information networks, but eventually succeeded in overtaking and transforming 
these networks into written ones, structured to their own preferences.151  Dependent on local elites, 
the British penetrated so deep into the existing structures of the native states that, according to 
Nicholas Dirks, they eventually created not only a colonial identity, but also traditions that are now 
considered authentic for India.152 As described by Bernard Cohn, forceful linguistic, educative, cultural 
and other transformative strategies co-effectuated the process of colonisation.153 According to Cohn, 
the British entered a new epistemological space in India, which required a network of collecting, 
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recording and interpreting information through different methods that Cohn calls ‘investigative 
modalities.’154 By clustering information structures and the observational groups in these modalities 
the colony became manageable. Constantly reducing complex existing structures into their own 
“interpretational rational metonyms” enabled the British to reshape colonial control and thus the 
colony itself in its entirety.155 The deep connection between native and colonial circuits of information 
can thus be seen as the underlying medium of colonial management in British-India. 
On Java, the VOC headquarters in Batavia had maintained a large inter-Asian network of 
correspondence and intelligence gathering to support its commercial activities. While this network 
functioned relatively smoothly, correspondence between the ‘nodding points’ in Amsterdam, Cape 
Town and Batavia often faltered.156 As a trading empire the VOC’s network never aimed at nor sufficed 
in providing information to govern vast amounts of land, let alone an entire island.157 The foundations 
of the VOC network were therefore removed by Daendels, whose policy of centralization aimed at 
generating more constant and complete information relevant for executing governance. This policy 
was continued with increasing success by the British, as illustrated by Raffles’ profound History of Java 
(1817).158 Formalization of the early information network happened after the British interregnum, 
when several steps were taken to regulate by decree the obligation of residents to provide the 
Government-General with adequate and constant amounts of information. So-called commissioner-
generals were appointed to check whether these steps were actually carried out.159 The Dutch based 
themselves, as shown by Charles Jeurgens, on principles of rule that the British had introduced during 
the interregnum. Specific laws, initiated by Raffles but ratified by Van den Capellen compelled the 
residents to traverse their districts on a regular and systematic basis, to gather information about the 
‘general mood’ of the population and the native chiefs, and report continuously to the Government-
General.160 Journeys like these had been undertaken by high VOC-officials prior to the nineteenth 
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century, but never on such a systematic basis, and never motivated by regulations and ambitions of 
governance. 
Scott’s ‘high modernism’, as explained in chapter two, showcases the project of knowledge 
gathering. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, European scientists, missionaries 
and other travellers started to investigate the unknown with new, overwhelming enthusiasm.161 The 
practice of professional maritime and scientific knowledge-gathering had supported the construction 
of ‘administrative exploration networks’ throughout South-Africa and South- and Southeast Asia very 
well during the VOC-era, by generating geographic and ethnographic information and compiling 
maps.162 In the 1820s the influx of scientists surged, and they brought along sophisticated techniques 
and procedures of observation to gather information.163 Professionalized scientific studies, ranging 
from geological, climatic and natural to anthropologic, cultural and linguistic science were instigated 
by the Dutch government in order to ‘rediscover’ the colony. Stimulating a new attitude of trying to 
understand the native world, the presence of this new group of scientists and other persons that were 
not civil servants created the breeding ground for the colonial government to take the first steps in 
regulating information gathering and control. Scientific knowledge, the remains of the old VOC-
network and the regulation of information gathering were the first steps of the Dutch Government, 
centrally and locally, to construct governance. Increasingly, the hunger for knowledge institutionalized 
the provision of information, and vivified Cohn’s ‘investigative modalities’ on Java. 
The institutionalization of knowledge made the resident offices the prime mappers and sources 
of information-production. It was because of this practice that colonial governmental archives were 
created, which makes us more aware of Stoler’s notion that archives are not just a source for finding 
historical, but also “artefacts in themselves, displaying the customs of and the very substance of 
colonial politics and rule.”164 More experienced colonial officials knew how to play ball with their 
superiors in Batavia; knowledge played an important role in colonial politics and the possession of 
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specific knowledge had influence on the importance of an official. The staff in Batavia played a similar 
game with its superiors in The Hague. This raised the concern of the Minister of Colonies and the rest 
of the Dutch government about communication within the Dutch colonial state apparatus.165 
Moreover, the practice of distorting communication and manipulating the information stream by 
residents and higher officials in Batavia had a deep impact on the actual division of information, of 
which traces remained preserved in the paper archives.166 This means that information received in The 
Hague had already passed different lenses and had probably undergone massive editing and 
manipulation. This information-stream emerged from the link between regents and residents. 
To problematize the spread of colonial information even further, this link was already infected, as 
shown by Stoler. According to her, the architects of and functionaries in the colonial empire attempted 
to construct “social kinds and racial categories to frame the illusive amount of structures, processes, 
information and events” that emerged under their noses, but consequently suffered from an epistemic 
anxiety when they found out they did not know what they thought they knew.167 Stoler uses the multi-
layered writings of colonial servant F.C. Valck on the murder of a planter family on Sumatra in the 
1870s, as an example of clashes between colonials and colonized and the vulnerability of the 
colonizer’s knowledge, and thus also the limits of his power.168 Though set in a different timeframe, 
Stoler’s characterization succeeds in exemplifying the precariousness of colonial knowledge. On the 
other hand, as mentioned in the introduction, Stoler primarily uses reports and letters derived from 
the higher levels of the colonial government, all from the archives in The Hague. In her argument a not 
yet identified cultural or political distance between residents and regents caused the epistemic anxiety 
now lodged in ‘particular archival forms.’169 I will try to add to Stoler’s observations by emphasizing 
that colonial agents were part of the same system as the native rulers, who were both entangled in 
close relationships, and that actions based on gathered knowledge influenced both. The cases 
displayed below make clear that the reality of colonial rule on the ground was much more complex 
than anticipated by the Government-General. 
Local intelligence gathering 
Influenced by the reforms of Daendels, Raffles and Van der Capellen, residents started to construct 
their own local information networks in order to sufficiently satisfy the needs of the Government-
Generals and Ministers of Colonies. Communication networks were intensified. Maintenance of roads 
and mail-service through herendiensten, such as Daendels’ Grote Postweg, became a major concern 
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of the residents and one of the main stimuli behind the physical growth of the information network.170 
In Semarang in 1833 for example, the resident threatened to fire the native personnel responsible for 
taking care of the carriages and horses, after complaints from his superiors in Batavia about the slow 
and poorly organized post service in his residency.171 This kind of clear emphasis put on the importance 
of well-organized mail services illustrates the growth of the Dutch information network. 
The practice of gathering information became quickly standardized. Special decrees from 1820 
and 1823 ordained residents to create extensive reports based on statistic data, like the geographic 
position of villages, population growth, the names, ranks and titles of local heads and so on, all to be 
send to Batavia.172 From then onward, residencies were mandatorily quantified and systemized using 
scientific methods, in order to collect all available statistics about every single desa, district, regency 
and all of its chiefs. As a result, one of the residents’ prime-references for information about their 
residencies was the work of former residents. Specific reports, the Memorie van Overgave (Final 
Memorandum) were drawn up, in which a resident, at the end of his term, presented all information 
concerning the state of the residency and the local ruling houses.173 This was not institutionalized until 
at least 1849, so it remains unclear if it was mandatory or not, and if every resident made these kind 
of final reports. The practicability of the measures imposed by Van der Capellen and Van den Bosch in 
general always remained doubtful; the practices and techniques of residents varied widely. The first 
thing most residents probably did when they started in a new residency was looking at these reports 
and corresponding with their predecessors and immediate colleagues.174 The experience of a resident, 
based on what he saw with his own eyes, was still the most reliable source of information. Three 
specific methods jump out in the residents’ attempts to collect intelligence. Occasionally residents 
requested information directly from the regents. A bundle in the archives of Semarang contains empty, 
pre-designed forms about desas, with a request from the resident to fill in the name and exact location 
of residence of every villager.175 Otherwise controleurs or other officials were sent out to specific 
regencies to verify the location of the desas and fields and carry out population censuses. Lists with 
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the names and locations of desas, the number of households, cash-crop fields and a survey of details 
concerning the local heads and population are omnipresent in bundles with correspondence in the 
colonial archives. For the Dutch this was an easy way to oversee the residency. Obtaining accurate data 
of regents however could apparently also be problematic: the regents of Grobogan, Kendal and Demak 
in Semarang for example were suspected of manipulating data in order to increase their salaries.176 
The regents of Grobogan and Demak also both claimed the same village, inhabited by 400 people, to 
be under their realm.177 Verifying all data obtained from the regents was not possible as according to 
the resident there was simply not enough manpower to monitor all regencies at the same time.178  
A second type of information gathering, specifically to inform about the regents’ activities and 
behaviour, was sending in spies. Usually these were native civil servants that had gained the resident’s 
trust. Typically these were so-called magang, unpaid apprentices, usually young priyayi who attached 
themselves to and lived with the family of an official. The magang and the official developed a valuable 
tie, giving room to various forms of intrigue beneath the surface of official policy.179 Reports of using 
spies do not appear often in the archival material, which might indicate that they were used only as a 
last resort, when the regents’ behaviour awoke serious suspicion. The regents probably carried out 
this practice as well by sending translators or family members to the residents’ office with a double 
agenda: making contact with the residents and managing official business, but also keeping their eyes 
open and acquiring information.180 This is one of those undisclosed practices that did not make it into 
the archives extensively, but Bayly showed that it was widespread in India.181 While traces of Javanese 
spies are not easy to find, the resident of Semarang in the early 1840s did have suspicions of native 
officials spying on him, which he noted down in his reports to warn his colleagues for “exceptional 
curiosities” by their Javanese servants.182  
The resident of Semarang was very much concerned about the behaviour and loyalty of his 
regents. Therefore he compiled detailed files about them and their families. Intense communication 
with the courts stood at the basis of extensive accounts on births, marriages, successions to the throne 
and other positions, and many other events, while spying and communicating with nobles outside the 
                                                          
176 Semarang 2255 ‘Uitgaande brieven aan de Regenten in de residentie Semarang 1827, 1829, 1830, 1831-
1833, 1835’: ‘letter 377, assistant-resident to the resident of Semarang’, 2 August 1833. 
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178 Ibidem. 
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in the archives (see below) that do implicate residents making use of the services of trusted Javanese priyayi-
servants. 
180 Houben, Kraton and kumpeni: 126-9;  
181 Baily, Empire and information: 60-1, 95-6. 
182 ANRI: Surakarta 476 ‘Voorstel van een huwelijk tussen Pangeran A. Mankunegoro en (..) 1848’: ‘Tweede 
Rapport over de rijksbestierder, 1846’. 
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court informed the resident about the daily activities, behaviour and attitude of the regent.183 Based 
on reports by predecessors and on research by his servants the resident of Semarang constructed 
family trees and lists with the names and titles of the noble families.184 These files were kept in the 
local archives and served as the main reference for new residents to get a grip on information about 
the ruling houses in the residency. In 1846, the resident of Surakarta received a bundle with all names 
and titles of the current Sultan complete with an overview of the history of the residency and the local 
noble families since VOC-times. In a letter to the official who had sent this to him, he expressed great 
delight since it would show him which family members “would remain loyal to the government.”185 
The bundle was apparently constantly extended, as files in new hand scriptures showed up after every 
few pages, signed by different persons in different places and on different dates, up until 1861.186 This 
bundle easily provokes the idea of the resident having it lying in a drawer, as his prime, encyclopaedic 
reference point about the regencies’ noble families under his control, to which new chapters were 
constantly added. The bundle also includes all kinds of observations about the state of the local colonial 
army and the attitude towards the Dutch of the local elite.187 Apparently, residents constructed their 
own small clusters of information, simply as reference for other officials to get insight into the relations 
with the local noble houses. However, all files in this document, including the small guiding notes from 
when the file was sent around or replaced, are signed by residents and assistant residents, which 
indicates that the bundle was not accessible for everyone. Intrinsic knowledge of the noble families 
was valuable, so the division and accessibility of this kind of information must have been strictly 
regulated. 
The inspection tours of Raffles and Van der Capellen can be considered a third form of intelligence 
gathering. The residents paid visits to the most important noblemen during these tours, and were 
obliged to draw up memoranda of their meetings and send these to Batavia. The Surakarta bundle of 
1846-1861 was most likely partly the result of this practice. Visits to the regents’ courts were obviously 
important in terms of diplomatic contact, but by simply perceiving the daily comings and goings at 
these courts with their own eyes, the residents must also have gotten their fair share of information 
about the local nobility. 
 
                                                          
183 Houben, Kraton and kumpeni: 96. 
184 See for example: ANRI: Semarang 2278 ‘Geslachtlijsten inlandse hoofden’ and for another example outside 
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185 ANRI: Surakarta 476: ‘Rapport t.a.v. de prinsen in Surakarta, 1846’. 
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The problem of language 
Acquiring information was the first step, interpreting the second. Many of the reports and letters sent 
by a regent needed to be translated first, as very few residents were capable of understanding local 
languages like Javanese and Madurese. Some of them did not even understand Classic Malay (the 
diplomatic lingua franca at the time). Language skills were considered important but Dutchmen who 
spoke Malay or Javanese fluently were rare in the 1830s. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
administrative professionalism among residents was not at Weber’s optimum. Most lower BB-officials, 
many of whom were Indo-Europeans or native Javanese of noble families, had neither the discipline 
nor the interest to educate themselves in written Javanese language, administrative- and 
management-skills, or local history. For Javanese nobles, writing for example was a profession that 
belonged to those trained in it, and many of the regents were probably illiterate.188 An attempt to 
stimulate language training for Dutch and natives was taken up in 1832 in Surakarta when the Institute 
for Javanese languages was founded, largely on the initiative of a Dutch-bible translator named Johan 
Gericke, but, just like former attempts by Van der Capellen, it did not become a success.189 It took until 
the 1840s before proper schools for Dutch children as well as those (Indo-) Europeans that aimed for 
a career in the BB were opened as a result of the reforms in colonial education of Baud.190 In 1842 a 
two-year course in East Indian subjects was founded in Delft to train higher BB-officials, such as future 
residents and assistant-residents.191 But colonial rule in the 1830s was constructed on personal skills 
and talent in social interaction with the native elite; sheer lack of education and failure in practicability 
of regulations prevented an overarching method from taking shape.  
Prior to the first steps in professionalizing the BB, residents thus relied on interpreters or 
translators, who received information directly from local heads, requested by the local government. 
The translators stood at the bottom of the administrative body and could be either natives or Indo-
Europeans who had learned Dutch or (less often) Dutchmen who had learned the local language and 
Malay.192 However, as displayed in the archives, these translators did not “move in realms of life and 
thought which they wished to keep hidden from the rulers” as happened in India according to Baily.193 
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Disloyalty amongst personnel on Java was easy to trace. Most translators were part of the residents 
administrative body, “employed as clerk”, earning about 30 to 60 guilders per month (depending on 
years of service and capability), and thus incorporated into the official bureaucracy.194 They stood 
under supervision of a (Dutch) Senior Translator, who earned up to 200 guilders per month and was 
able to check the work of all of the other translators.195 The body of translators was of major 
importance, as they held the key to interpreting all correspondence. Quite often, these senior 
translators formed a group related by kinship that became tightly attached to the noble courts.196 
Some of the Translators managed to create confidential relationships with the regents, as happened 
in Surakarta between translator C.F. Winter Sr., who was of Indo-European descent, and Susuhunan 
Pakubuwana VII in the 1860s.197 However, their Dutch supervisors always expected the translators to 
remain the loyal agents of the colonial system. Often translators stood in contact with the chief 
minister of the regent, the Patih, who was burdened with the daily administrative governance of the 
regent. The Patihs had similar positions as the Senior Translators, since many of them functioned as 
the intermediate between the residents’ and the regents’ offices. They were the closest advisors of 
the regents, but officially in service of the Dutch bureaucracy, like the regents themselves. The Patihs 
were involved in all discussions and consultations with the regents that concerned the Javanese realm 
and political activities.198 So whereas the regents were the sacred traditional power-holders, the patihs 
were the ones that carried out actual political authority. Though the government could dismiss patihs, 
many of them were cunning and powerful enough to politically survive their regents and remain in the 
saddle for longer than any other colonial official, either Javanese or Dutch.199 Sasradiningrat II for 
example was Patih at the court of Surakarta from 1812 to 1846, and witnessed the reign of 
Pakubuwana IV to Pakubuwana VII, dealing with quite a number of residents. He had family ties to the 
royal family, and enjoyed great trust of the people, but was not very fond of the family for various 
reasons. According to Houben, he was cunning and knew how to do business with the Dutch, but 
managed to keep them at enough distance to carry out his own agenda.200 
The Patihs and Translators were deeply integrated in the Dutch bureaucratic system. In fact, 
together with the residents and assistant-residents they formed its very spine. The complex 
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involvement of these functionaries creates a colonial reality very similar to the one defined by Baily 
and Cohn in British-India. But on Java residents did not just suffer from “the basic fear of lack of 
indigenous knowledge and ignorance of the ‘wiles of the natives’, (…) their secret letters, drumming 
and ‘bushy telegraphy’ and the nightly passage of seditious agents masquerading as priests and holy 
men.”201 Their fear was of a different, more political kind, and likely not merely epistemic. Mostly, it 
was fear for rebellion and disruption that caused the residents to send in spies and keep a close eye 
on the whereabouts of the regent. Distrust was the dominant underlying sentiment, even if both 
parties enjoyed a good relationship. The regents and residents knew each other’s culture, habits, uses, 
political techniques and rule – and that is why they ‘feared’ each other. So it was not despite, but 
because contact with regents and the existence of the extensive information network that residents 
distrusted or ‘feared’ the regents. 
3.2 Direct encounters: methods of rule 
 
The practice of the residents and regents to collect information about each other served one basic 
purpose in the end: to profit as much as possible from the new system and each other’s resources. 
Locally, the new system soon became one of mutual interests, in which the residents and regents 
depended on each other. The communication and information networks formed a major pillar for the 
establishment of a workable situation to enhance control and serve all interests. But overall, the Dutch 
structurally penetrated deeper into Javanese society than ever before. Various methods were used by 
the Dutch in an attempt to impregnate and control the world of local aristocracy. By using native 
etiquette, awarding gifts and titles, and sometimes involving themselves directly in court politics, the 
Dutch maintained close contact with their Javanese counterparts. 
Hormat, gifts and titles 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries VOC officials had become increasingly experienced 
in dealing with indigenous rulers all over Asia, especially in the Indonesian archipelago. Numerous 
sultans, rajas, princes and other nobles were approached and manipulated by ‘opperhoofden’ (head-
merchants) and residents, then nothing more but representatives of the trading company, to settle 
trading-contracts.202 However, the idea of Dutch cultural or moral ‘superiority’ had grown as the VOC 
became increasingly powerful on Java, and was endorsed by Van den Bosch’ policy. Supported by this 
sense of superiority, the Dutch residents socially enjoyed a greater status than the regents did, 
although the residents were heavily influenced by the priyayi in both their professional and personal 
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behaviour when performing diplomatic duties.203 The result was that eventually Dutch officials started 
requiring use of ‘native etiquette’, or hormat, for example when visiting the regents’ kratons.204 
Hormat was the whole practice on Java of paying respect in humble behaviour towards those that are 
socially placed higher than you. The Dutch cunningly and eagerly made use of hormat.205 More and 
more it became a product of the colonial administration as the Javanese were dependent on the 
goodwill of higher officials for their progress, and thus inevitable tended to use hormat traditions as 
an “institutionalized form of sycophancy.”206 
Sycophancy is clearly visible in the communication between Dutch and Javanese, both written and 
spoken. VOC letters to Asian kings, heads and officials were highly diplomatic in tone, using long 
preambles and salutations (partly depending on the importance and status of the ruler), and so were 
the letters of the rulers to the castle of Batavia. However, when the Dutch started dominating the 
political scene on Java, their tone became less humble and more forceful. In the 1830s, little was left 
of their carefulness, and as residents and regents started corresponding on a weekly, if not daily basis, 
the letters of a resident became increasingly curt and abrupt. Typically, regents sent polite requests 
for salary increases or complained about workload to the resident. For example, a letter from the 
regent of Kendal (a regency in Semarang) to resident Pieter le Clercq (?-1839, in office 1828-1834), 
about a request for an increase of salary for his family for coffee production started as follows (Classic 
Malay in Dutch spelling): 
“Ini soerat dengan tabee banyak begitoe dan segala hormat (…) dari Pangeran Ario 
Prawiro Diningrat di negri Kendal kapada toean P. le Clercq Resident njang hormat di negri 
Semarang.” (This is a letter with many greetings and all respect from the prince Arya 
Prawiro Diningrat of Kendal to the (or: his) master, the honourable resident P. le Clercq 
of Semarang.)207 
Constructions like “njang dengan banyak hormat” (with much respect or honour) and “toean 
Resident poenja banyak hormat” (the very honourable master Resident) are often repeated. Samples 
from bundles of letters from residents to regents show that the letters of the resident of Semarang to 
this regent are straight to the point and skip all of these formalities.208 In 1833 for example we find 
correspondence between the same resident and the regent of Demak (in Semarang), about a new 
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house for a controleur, build under supervision of the regent. While the letters of the regent are similar 
in tone to the one quoted above, the resident’s letters are short and keep informing about the status 
of the construction works, urging the regent to hurry up (the house was not finished before the end of 
this resident’s term).209 
Illustrative is the attitude of the resident of Semarang towards the regent of Grobogan, known by 
the Dutch as ‘Maas Toemmengoeng Majoor Noto Rojo’ (Mas Tumenggung Marmo Nataraja, Bupati 
Purwodadi Grobogan). Known as a troublemaker, this regent was very unpopular among Dutch 
officials. In early 1834, he kept sending in requests for financial support for a former penghulu (a local 
Islamic priest, sometimes chief).210 The local controleur der landbouwinkomsten (inspector of 
agricultural incomes) knew from other nobles that this penghulu had to cede two fifths of his income 
as a wedding priest to the regents’ wife and that he also paid land rent to the local Demang (district 
head) for renting rice-fields, of which also a share flowed to the regent. Therefore it was decided to 
pay eight guilders to the penghulu directly as a monthly pension (which doubled his income), without 
involvement of the regent, to prevent the regent from laying his hands on this pension as well.211 A 
strong signal, bypassing the regent and preventing him from gaining extra (illegal) income, this 
measure was harsh – Nataraja was reported to have been not amused, which reflected on the mood 
of the population – but apparently considered necessary.212 Keeping these ‘difficult’ regents in control 
without disturbing the ‘general mood’ in the regency was a tricky game in which the resident had to 
balance Dutch and Javanese interests. 
A cultural difference of which the Dutch keenly tried to take advantage in addressing the Javanese 
aristocrats was the division of the Javanese language into registers. The Dutch tried to stimulate the 
use of Krama (High-Javanese) by natives, as this was a sign of respect, allowing them to distinguish 
themselves socially by use of language.213 In the principalities, the princes were therefore expected to 
address the Dutch in High-Javanese.214 However, the proficiency of the residents in Ngoko (Low-
Javanese, the proper register used in response to Krama) or even basic Malay differed enormously. 
Improper use of language, especially Javanese, was considered slightly offensive and could impair the 
social relations between residents and regents.215 In 1834, the new resident of Semarang, Hendrik le 
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Roux (1795-?, in office 1831-1834), paid a visit to Nataraja in order to arrange an event at the regent’s 
pendopo. According to the report “the resident thought the regent behaved incorrect according to his 
rank” and was reprimanded for “his use of low Malay.” Nataraja, imaginably still in dispute about being 
overruled earlier that year, responded agitated when the resident, whom he knew did not understand 
Javanese, assigned an interpreter from the regent’s household who understood some Dutch.216 
Javanese language played an important role in priyayi-etiquette, and speaking flawed Javanese or 
making abuse of the situation as resident le Roux did was (and still is) considered very discomforting, 
or even offending, especially towards high Javanese nobles. Nataraja must have been puzzled by the 
in his eyes idiosyncratic behaviour of the resident. He became angrier with the Dutch and the general 
mood of the population in the regency was reported to turn sour as the regent who felt insulted 
apparently refused to conduct his daily activities for a few days.217 Though he was known as a restive 
and stubborn regent, the Government-General probably did not want to risk more trouble or even a 
revolt, as Grobogan was of major importance for the production of rice, and later in 1834 Le Roux was 
replaced.218 The necessity of refurbishing and protecting the position of the regents, as noted by Elson, 
was stronger than the urge to keep the residents in office. As Baud would have remarked, “The 
government would sooner dismiss ten residents than one regent.”219 After all, residents were mobile 
and dynamic, often spending not much more than three or four years in a residency before moving on 
to another, while the regents were bound to the people and the lands they ruled.220 Though 
discontinuity affected local policy since every new resident had his own style, ideas and attitude, the 
practice of reassigning residents proved to be an effective way of maintaining peace and stability in 
the local Dutch-Javanese relationship.221 The residents had very good reasons to make use of 
diplomatic, cultural traditions. It was after all the most powerful instrument to demand respect in 
‘indigenous’ terms. Since Van den Bosch had never really designed a clear plan for approaching 
regents, most residents had to improvise. For a Dutch resident, using hormat traditions was the easiest 
way to culturally penetrate into the local world and show off authority. During meetings that must 
have been somewhat primly, lower placed persons were supposed to sit on the ground, while the 
resident and the regent sat in chairs. The social position of the resident, the assistant-resident, other  
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Figure 2: The regent of Pekalongan (middle), Raden Adipati Arya Wiryodinegara, 
receives members of the Binnenlands Bestuur, 28 June 1869. Left from the 
regent presumably the new resident R.P.W. MacGillavry and right of him 
presumably the new regent of Batang, Raden Adipati Arya Puspodiningrat. On 
the chair left in front of the pendopo presumably the patih of Pekalongan, 
Raden Mertonegoro. Personal ranking is clearly represented in this picture: the 
regent sits in the middle, surrounded by the Dutch officials sitting on chairs on 
the veranda, the patih is sitting slightly lower than them while the Javanese 
officials are all sitting on the ground. 
Source: Rijksmuseum, object number NG-2011-29-28 in: Vues de Java. 
See also: S. Wachlin, Woodbury and Page, photographers Java 
(reprint, Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994): 106. 
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Dutch officials, the regent and the regents’ household and staff was emphasized by physically 
positioning them, as clearly visible in figure 2. Posing for a photo, the Dutch officials surrounded the 
regent, stressing their proximity to the throne quite literally, while the patih and lower court-members 
sat lower and on the ground, illustrating the order of people in the colonial setting.222 Elitist, ‘regal’ 
behaviour became increasingly common among residents, who demanded the highest forms of 
respect. An interesting example is the practice of carrying around a golden payong.223 Though taken in 
1904, when this practice was much more common and widespread than in the 1830s, figure 3 is an 
excellent example of a proud resident using a payong, a pusaka and a native object, carried by a 
Javanese servant, as a status symbol. It was the absence of a deliberate outline by Van den Bosch for 
imposing Dutch rule and a sheer lack of foundations for bureaucratic development, such as proper 
education, that stimulated the residents to make use of what was available. Javanese methods of rule, 
either through objects of power or language, were just as useful as Dutch. 
Another method comprised the practice of exchanging gifts, which has always been an important 
diplomatic instrument in Asia and Europe. The VOC always made sure to send enough highly valuable 
gifts or cash money to maintain good trade-relations with rulers all around the Indian Ocean.224 Among 
Asian rulers, “gifts of right to lands, titles, emblems, and honours by kings to their subjects became, in 
cultural terms, the dynamic medium for the constitution of political relations (…), acceptance of gifts 
entailed loyalty and service (…), and gifts were the fundamental signs of sovereignty, which, as long as 
it emanated from the centre, was distributed and displayed at every level within the kingdom.”225 For 
the kings, regents and lesser nobles on Java it was a natural way to show respect and gain favour by 
sending gifts to whomever they considered a prime overlord, which from the 1830s onward was the 
resident. The resident of Semarang for example requested specific art-objects and vegetables from the 
regent of Kendal, though his wife had send back a similar package containing art-objects, rice and 
timber from the regent of Demak, claiming she did not have enough storage space for it.226 It appears 
that this was mostly a political act: the resident of Kendal attempted to raise the pension the 
government paid to his mother and got approval from the resident to write to the Governor-General 
on his behalf, while the regent of Demak was recently reprimanded for misbehaviour and  
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Figure 3: P. Sijthoff, resident of Semarang, and his golden payong in 1904. 
The function of the payong as a status symbol is quite clear here. The 
traditional outfit and humble look of the carrier and smart, neat dress and 
proud stance of the resident seem to underline the allure of the resident’s 
position. 
Source: 2603 (foto), Nederlands-Indië in foto's, 1860-1940, Koninklijk 
Instituut voor taal-, land- en volkenkunde (KITLV). 
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maltreatments, for which the resident had considered firing him.227 Denying the gifts from Demak was 
probably a method to ignore any pleas, while accepting the bribes of the regent of Kendal showed 
approval.  
The resident of Semarang had no choice really but to take part in the gift-culture: in April and May 
1834 it happened at least four times that he received gifts and a request in return, which in all cases 
helped to solve different kinds of small political or personal problems.228 Especially remarkable is the 
case of Lurah (village chief) ‘Wereio Sentono’ (Wereya Sentana) of the desa ‘Sadee’ in the regency of 
Grobogan, who requested the resident for compensation of a couple of cows that had been killed and 
eaten by a tiger. In return, the Lurah intended to send the resident the skin of the tiger, which he had 
just killed.229 
The Government-General became increasingly worried about the practice of gift exchange. 
Accepting gifts from those regents that had interest in ‘bribing’ the resident did not comply with the 
policy of abstinence Van den Bosch proposed, and could stimulate corruption. Reason enough for 
Governor-General Baud to send out an announcement at the end of 1834 to strictly regulate, and 
eventually prohibit the practice of sending gifts or payments by barter.230 Accepting goods like timber, 
wood, house-hold goods and oil was no longer allowed. The regents and residents, for whom this 
practice had become a very important diplomatic instrument, sought all kinds of ways to evade these 
new regulations, for example by registering gifts as tax-payments.231 The reality of local cooperation 
was based on practices the Government-General  did not want to acknowledge, leaving the residents 
no choice but to carry out a policy they constructed themselves, even if that meant ignoring the 
instructions of their superiors in Batavia. 
The awarding of (indigenous) ranks and titles by residents can be considered a final important 
method of governance. During the VOC-era, it was already customary to award those allied rulers that 
had distinguished themselves by their loyalty with new titles or promote them to a higher rank. When 
the Pangreh Praja was put under the direct control of the BB and became part of the Dutch 
administration, handing out titles became much more important. The regents, as part of the Dutch 
system, received administrative legitimation from the Dutch. During the first three decades of the 
nineteenth century the entire system of indigenous titles was integrated and transmitted into the 
                                                          
227 ANRI: Semarang 2255: ‘Brieven van de Resident van Semarang aan regent van Kendal’, 25 June en 2 July 
1829’. 
228 ANRI: Semarang 2260: letters of 6, 12 and 30 April and 19 May 1834, in Malay. 
229 ANRI: Semarang 2260: letter of 6 April, in Malay. 
230 ANRI: Semarang 3346 ‘Staat van het verrichte persoonlijke diensten bij de Inlandse hoofden per desa, 1835/ 
Opgave desas af sonder voor het verrigten der persoonlijke diensten bij de inlandsche hoofden’: ‘Ordonnantie 
van Baud’, 6 November 1834. 
231 ANRI: Semarang 3346: ‘Brief van de regent aan de resident van Semarang’, 14 January 1835. 
58 
 
European administration. For example, a resolution of Van der Capellen from 1820 determined that 
all regents would receive the predicate of Adipati, Tummengung or Ngabehi according to their loyalty 
and integrity.232 Official titles were equalized with European military ranks, and resolutions of 1820 
and 1824 further arranged the regulations concerning combination of predicates and titles, though the 
authority connected to these titles was limited to the regency where they were received.233 The system 
of titles, as incorporated into Dutch bureaucracy, was under continuous alteration, but it certainly 
helped translating the Dutch administration into native terms, and at the same time politicized the 
indigenous ranking system into Dutch administrative terms. The instalment of the adequate Priyayi 
officials became much easier when done in their own traditional political perspectives, and encouraged 
the population to accept their native rulers whilst functioning within the Dutch framework. 
Dutch involvement in court politics 
In their attempts to get a grip on the local noble families, the Dutch did not avoid direct intervention. 
In the principalities, the ties with those noble families that had already allied with the Dutch under 
VOC-rule proved very useful in the 1830s. The former Mataram Empire and its noble houses had been 
under increasing Dutch influence since the eighteenth century. In Surakarta, the Dutch installed 
Susuhunan Pakubuwana VI in 1823 despite fierce opposition within the court.234 He was considered a 
cumbersome king, as he had sympathized with Dipanagara during the war, but he was still favoured 
over the other candidates.235 Though initially distrustful, Pakubuwana VI developed a more conciliatory 
attitude towards the Dutch during the Java war.236 However, in 1830 he undertook an activity that was 
perceived as plainly rebellious, as he sneaked out of the kraton and went to his ancestors’ family graves 
at Imogiri without the resident’s permission.237 This sneaky behaviour was considered highly unworthy 
of a Susuhunan, and the Dutch were well aware that “even in the eyes of the Javanese this act was 
considered just as unlawful, disrespectful as dangerous”, and that this “opportunity should be used to 
remove this young king from his throne, before his prideful, idiosyncratic behaviour would disrupt 
Java’s peace.”238 A committee of three experienced colonial officials, resident Johan van Nes (1795-
1874), Directeur der Kultures Jan van Sevenhoven (1782-1841) and army officer Huibert Nahuys van 
Burgst (1782-1852) (see also appendix 2.2), was installed to examine the situation and reform local 
governance. The committee found support among Pakubuwana’s (Javanese) rivals and started to 
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undermine his position. Eventually Pakubuwana VI was dismissed and replaced by his uncle, Pangeran 
Adipati Purbaya, who reigned as Pakubuwana VII.239  
Pakubuwana VII was much more popular among the Dutch; under his rule “peace and prosperity 
in the residency of Surakarta were beyond all expectation.”240 But trouble was far from over. The new 
Susuhunan did not have any legal male heirs, which raised uncertainty about the future of the 
throne.241 This was a returning theme in the politics of Surakarta. Over the years, resident Frans Valck 
(1799-1842, resident of Yogyakarta 1831-1841) regularly corresponded with the Governor-General 
and other residents who had some experience in the principalities about possible candidates for the 
throne.242 Aware of the importance of family ties, Valck mentioned he brother and the nephew of the 
Susuhunan as potential successors. They were the candidates that were the friendliest and most 
obedient towards the Dutch while still standing close to the Susuhunan.243 The Dutch worried about 
succession rights all over Java, but due to the high status and relative autonomous position of the 
influential Susuhunans, matters around the throne of Surakarta always were just a bit more relevant. 
In the principalities, however, the Dutch had proved themselves of strong influence long before 
the nineteenth century. In 1754 the Dutch had awarded one of their old-VOC allies in Mataram, Mas 
Said (a son of Susuhunan Pakubuwana II), with an independent status in the former mancanegara of 
Surakarta as prince Mangkunegara I (r. 1757-1797).244 He received the title of Pangeran Adipati and 
was granted rule over 4000 Cacah’s (households or families, used as a unit of measurement for land 
and population on Java to determine taxation rights), in the newly created principality of 
Mangkunegaran (see map 3).245 Mangkunegara I was very supportive towards the Dutch and in 1790 
the Governor-General made the important decision of granting him an army legion and awarding him 
with the rank of colonel. Mangkunegara I and his successors remained loyal, for which they constantly 
received rewards, like extension of the cacah’s and Karya’s (agricultural lands), or knighthoods 
(Mangkunegara was knighted in the Order of the Dutch Lion; see figure 4).246 Pangeran Adipati 
Prangwadana, the grandson of Mangkunegara I, inherited the title of his grandfather. As 
Mangkunegara II (r. 1797-1836), he commanded a standing legion and became the most prominent 
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military leader on Central Java.247 After the British occupation Mangkunegara II was slightly distrusted 
because he had sympathized with the British regime. When the resident paid him a visit for the first 
time after Java was returned to the Dutch, the Pangeran’s troops were wearing British uniforms, and 
the resident worried if his loyalty was not somewhat too flexible.248 Of even larger concern was the 
balance of power in the region; the Dutch could not allow the Mangkunegara family to start politically 
overarching the Susuhunan of Surakarta, since this could endanger the balance of power as preserved 
by the Dutch.249 
The next successor, Mangkunegara III (r. 1835 – 1853), was a great relief for the Dutch. He referred 
heavily to his grandfather’s loyalty and achievements (Mangkunegara I was known to have participated 
in the defence of the kraton of Yogya against the rebels quite fiercely during the Java war), just to 
prove his own loyalty. In the ‘Act of Covenent’, that was settled in 1835 and formally approved the 
extension of the Dutch alliance with the Mangkunegara’s,  Mangkunegara III promised never to take 
up any action to the Dutch or to the “legal ruler of Surakarta, his royal highness Pakubuwana IV”, and 
avoid any confrontation with other regents in the area.250 Later on, a Dutch resident wrote: 
“The current Pangeran Adipati Ario Manku Negoro is a man of about 45 years old. He 
is not only very much affected to the Dutch Government, but actually has the urge to 
associate with the Dutch, as the Dutch cause appears to have the highest priority for 
him. He has a kind and mild nature and leads a modest life, on which his extravert 
dealing with women makes an exception. He is somewhat indolent and lacks 
autonomy and is very indifferent about managing finances.”251 
This was exactly what the Dutch needed. Mangkunegara III formed a stable element in the 
dynamic and competitive political scene of Surakarta and Yogyakarta, but to the Dutch he did not seem 
a very strong ruler and seemed to lacked political cunningness and vigour, and thus was easy to control. 
He was well known and respected because of his grandfather’s achievements and reputation, and 
therefore considered a legitimate ruler by his population. Above all, he was exceptionally loyal to the 
Dutch cause, and liked engaging in personal relationships with Dutchmen. While other principality 
families were continuously rivalling each other, this “ignorant” Pangeran Mangkunegara III remained 
loyal to the Dutch and together with his legion formed a stable, strong and controllable element. 
Mangkunegara III appealed directly to his grandfather’s merits and achievements (see figure 4), and 
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his successors did the same, since they knew that the Dutch, in their need of solid, traditional authority, 
would recognize the heredity of their predecessors’ ranks, titles and positions, and could guarantee a 
stable income and a continuous position as an independent ruler. The Mangkunegara’s passed on the 
very uniform and even the knighthoods as if they were pusaka, which, perhaps, they became indeed. 
Mangkunegara III and his family became increasingly rich and powerful during the 1830s and 1840s. 
This regent family clearly took advantage of of the Dutch stimulus behind the use of traditional power 
in order to remain in power and accumulate more wealth. 
The Mangkunegaras provide in an excellent example of regents that had allied with the VOC and 
remained close allies of the Dutch during the colonial era. They were among the strongest pillars on 
which the Dutch were able to construct colonial rule on Central Java. Throughout the island the 
residents were concerned with the division of power among regents. In similar ways, Javanese regents 
were concerned with their heirs. The grandson of Sasradiningrat II, the patih of the Sunan of Surakarta, 
was send out on an inspection of the roads between Surakarta and Grobogan in 1834, in preparation 
of his function as regent.252 This grandson, Raden Ngabehi ‘Sastrowidakdo’ (Sastrawidakda), was the 
direct heir of the regent, as his father had already died.253 On his way to Selo, a small village on this 
road, he passed to pay homage to the local ruler in name of his father and the residency, Sastrawidakda 
was reported to have contemplated tirakat (a religious practice of seeking solitude and meditation to 
temporary retreat from the world of men, and get in contact with ancestors and spirits to seek 
legitimation of ones actions), near or in an old, empty grave.254 Contemplating tirakat is an example of 
the type of concentration or asceticism that according Anderson influenced the ‘beam of light’, which 
is why Sastrawidakda was so keen on practicing it.255 The residents in Surakarta and Yogyakarta had 
carefully built up an extensive information network of carefully selected officials, so a local mantri 
reported the event directly to the residents of Surakarta and Yogyakarta.256 They contacted his father, 
the regent. Contemplating tirakat was considered highly undesirable for a soon-to-be regent. It was 
regarded to be something from a former era, not fitting in the practice of modern colonial rule, 
something for ascetic priests rather than modern regents, and, moreover, it was also something that 
had inspired Dipanagara in his actions, which is why it was considered (like many other religious 
practices) highly dangerous.257 The heir of a regent was not allowed to be religiously inspired or behave 
like ascetic priests in Dutch conceptualized rule. The regent was well aware of this and forbade his 
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grandson to make any trips in the future, while the native officials who accompanied him were all 
fired.258 
3.3 The resident as local king 
 
The Dutch concern with regents sometimes made them involve themselves in internal court affairs 
even more forcefully than already mentioned. In Yogyakarta, one of the princes who had switched 
sides to the Dutch during the Java War, Pangeran Adipati Mangkudiningrat II, started to behave 
‘vexingly’ to the Dutch. He was known as a ‘liar and a troublemaker.’ During Eastern 1831, it was 
reported that every night a group of boys gathered at his house and partied, which was considered 
“quite offensive” by the native civil servants. At one of these parties, as the story went, Mankudinigrat 
II apparently offended some of the higher Javanese officials, by spreading out the story that their 
regent did not take appropriate care of his kris, one of the most powerful pusaka. However, this story 
seems to have been twisted and exaggerated by a clerk that worked at the residents office, so it might 
not have been exactly true, but this does not change the fact that the story did have a great impact on 
the local population.259 Also, there was a rumour that the first wife of Makudinigrat II illegally traded 
in and was addicted to opium, which was eventually confirmed by one of the resident’s spies.260 Even 
worse, Makudinigrat was under suspicion of supporting a band of robbers, hiding them at his house 
and instigating robberies throughout the regency of Kedhu. His and his wife’s “rebellious character and 
actions” were strongly disapproved of by the resident. The moment these ‘rebellious actions’ were 
‘proven’ (the report of the spy appears to have functioned as primary evidence), the resident reported 
to Van den Bosch, and both were convinced that Mankudinigrat planned on overthrowing the Sultan 
of Yogyakarta to seize the throne.261 He was therefore arrested and exiled to Ambon in the beginning 
of 1832.262 Another prince, Pangeran Adipati Prabuningrat, a political rival of Mankudinigrat, was also 
a close ally of the Dutch. During the Java War he commanded the defence force of the kraton of 
Yogyakarta as a colonel in service of the Dutch East-Indian Army. In 1832, confident about his relation 
with the Dutch, he requested for his wife to be promoted to the rank of Ratu (queen), and his son to 
that of Pangeran Adipati (prince). While the second request was granted, Van den Bosch, who visited  
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 Figure 4: Pangeran Adipati Arya Mangkunegara IV, grandson of  
Makunagara III, in the Colonel costume he inherited from his predecessor 
and decorated with the Order of the Dutch Lion.  
Source: Rijksmuseum, object number NG-1988-30-D-4-1. See also: 
Wachlin, Woodbury & Page: 124. 
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the principalities and spoke with Prabuningrat in person, denied the first. After Van den Bosch had left, 
Prabuningrat started to display impetuous discontent about another regent and his wife who had been 
ranked above him.263 He accused the Dutch of ungratefulness and disloyalty and started to ignore the 
resident’s orders. Van den Bosch concluded that this prince also planned to instigate a rebellion, and 
he was arrested and sent into exile as well.264 Writing to Baud about this matter, Van den Bosch makes 
an interesting remark: 
“The rest in the principalities wasn’t disturbed for a single moment because of these events [the 
exile of Mangkudiningrat II and Prabudiningrat], which proves that we master the game and are able 
to continue the adopted state system by treating the Javanese rulers with all forms of modesty and 
courtesy, but on the other hand never accept on of them to deviate from the right path (…)”265 
Van den Bosch was apparently convinced that the Dutch were perfectly able to control the regents 
on Java without causing disruptions and unrest. His confidence in the Dutch capability of controlling 
Javanese politics was partially correct. The extensive intelligence networks proved that the Dutch were 
trying, both successfully and unsuccessfully, to penetrate into the Javanese world as deep as possible. 
By using court diplomacy, handing out titles, gifts, and military positions, the Dutch indeed took part 
in local political games in Surakarta and Semarang, exercising profound influence on the noble houses. 
On the other hand, local differentiation should be taken into account: in Grobogan the Dutch were 
thinner on the ground and thus needed to be more careful in dealing with the regent. Moreover, the 
residents in the 1830s were still largely dependent on the regents for most of their information and 
advice. 
A rehearsing, concluding analysis of my source material makes clear that personal relations and 
the characters of the regents and the residents mattered. Resident Le Roux in Semarang had a difficult 
relation with the regent of Grobogan, causing local governance to falter, while in Surakarta the good 
relations with the Mangkunegara family outside the direct borders of the city contributed to the 
maintenance of stability and security. Regents made use of the Dutch system, while the Dutch made 
use of the native system. Even though the residents did not possess the traditional authority of the 
regents, they did acquire a political role comparable to that of the traditional Javanese king in the 
mandala. Just like the precolonial overlords, the Dutch became the pivot in a political network of 
multiple regents who all tried to profit from their ties with the centre as much as they could, while 
attempting to remain as autonomous as possible. Of great importance were personal ties, intrigues 
and court diplomacy, practices that, indeed, apply well to the idea of a patrimonial state. With the 
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instalment and consolidation of the residency system on top of the ancient Javanese ruling class, the 
Dutch became the new overlords. The residents had to use a paradoxical combination of his own legal 
and the regents’ traditional rule that in the best scenario had profound influence on the population of 
the residency, and in the worst did not reach further than his own office. Pragmatism glued these 
differences together, and therefore we can only conclude that local authority was conducted not by a 
system of rules or ideas, but by a system of men of both ends of the chain, in which Dutch officials and 
Javanese nobles were of equally great importance. 
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4. Obstinacy of allies 
 
Though the precarious colonial relation seemed to have started to support a more or less stable 
regime, at least to the benefit of the Dutch government and the power of the regents, the 1830s knew 
plenty disruptions and minor revolts. Actions of sabotage such as stealing and burning cane were 
usually repressed by the colonial government, but every now and then, these actions developed into 
more serious forms of ‘unrest.’266 Though not omnipresent in the archives, these cases are very 
revealing in many ways. They show the underlying tensions in the relation between regents and 
residents, between local and central government and different opinions about the cultivation system.  
The former chapter examined the colonial relationship in its totality. In this chapter, I will focus 
specifically on period of ‘unrest.’ Rooted on three major archival cases I will show how the government 
interpreted uprisings of unrest, which in one case led to panic on both sides of the colonial chain, and 
in other cases had no clear implications at all. This chapter stresses the impossibility of rhyming 
pragmatic rule with the interests of all involved parties, stressing again that it were mostly personal 
capabilities and personal ties that mattered. My first case is treated in the work of colonial official and 
author Salomon van Deventer (1816-1891), and mentioned in the accounts of Elson and Van Niel. It 
took place in the residency of Pasuruan, East-Java, in 1833 (see map 6).267 Pasuruan was the heart of 
sugar production. The sugar mills in Pasuruan in the 1830s were largely in the hands of Chinese free 
entrepreneurs, who had contracts with the government for regular amounts of production.268 Sugar 
cane was grown on the fields in possession of the regents, which was the major cause for the unrest 
of 1833. My second case deals with a disruption in indigo production in the Cirebon residency in 1830-
1831, and is particularly interesting because of its political consequences. The final case deals with the 
murder of a resident on Sumatra, and serves as a contrast to Java, to show how a different setting 
implied a different approach, though not a successful one. After all, on Sumatra, Dutch control was still 
in its earliest stage and the incessant wars made the officials’ jobs much more difficult. 
Well visible in all these cases is that the paradoxical character of the patrimonial-bureaucratic 
colonial state crystalized during these disruptions. While both residents and regents attempted to take 
continuous advantage of each other, constant frictions and tensions maintained a distance between 
the Javanese and Dutch. The Java War of 1825-1830 had really shaped the mind-set of the officials of 
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the colonial government in the 1830s. In line with Van den Bosch’ detached policy of non-involvement, 
residents had to consider Dutch law as their prime reference point in case a regent misbehaved, even 
though concerning the Javanese population, knowledge and ratification of adat-law was encouraged. 
But this proved problematic. In Semarang in 1838 for example, a nobleman named ‘Kartorojo’ 
(Kartareja), the son in law of a Demang in Grobogan, was found guilty of illegal gambling by the 
infamous regent Nataraja of Grobogan. Nataraja confiscated all of Kartareja’s possessions and locked 
him up in a pig cage, an extremely humiliating punishment for a Muslim.269 These kinds of 
maltreatments, as well as ignoring and bypassing the Dutch legal system were a thorn in the side for 
the Dutch, who intended to once again reprimand Nataraja. However, though he had a history of 
disputes with the Dutch, Nataraja was not prosecuted, and though the direct reason this time is not 
mentioned in the archives, again the resident of Semarang was replaced the same year.270 Preserving 
order and peace was the more predominant urge in order to maintain colonial rule and support 
agricultural production, more important than keeping up the appearance of rule of (Dutch) law. But 
that this type of rule was not always compatible with the reality of managing the residency is shown 
by the disruption in Pasuruan. 
4.1 Evildoer or scapegoat? The case of the revolt in Pasuruan, 1833 
 
In august 1833, an estimated amount of about 5000 villagers gathered and occupied the alun-alun (the 
central square) of the city of Pasuruan, demanding a release from the burdening cultivation of sugar. 
For a week, they refused to leave, claiming that their local heads did not listen to their complaints. For 
the local resident, Van Nes, this was a frightening and worrying week, during which he corresponded 
intensely with the Government-General in Buitenzorg. A large amount of paperwork has been 
preserved of this small revolt, displaying the whole process and aftermath of this midsummer week of 
rebelliousness and tensions and the court cases against its prime suspects. 
So what exactly happened? At the end of August, Van Nes received message that the inhabitants 
of several villages had laid down their work in the sugar fields.271 He left the city of Pasuruan to inspect 
the situation himself and according to his following letters and reports, villagers in several desas in the 
districts of Gemping, ‘Ngimpit’ (Ngempit), Widongon and ‘Radjassa’ (Rejoso; Rejasa) (see map 6) 
complained to their regent and his patih on the 29th and 30th of July 1833 about having to cut and 
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harvest unripe rice to make space for sugarcane.272 Earlier that year, the residents’ office had awarded 
new contracts for sugar production, which incited a drastic demand for sugar cane.273 A major 
contributory problem was that the peasants had to walk large distances to bring the cane to the sugar 
mills.274 However, the regent did not take the villagers’ complaints serious, and had them sent away. 
The situation intensified, until on 2 August 1833 almost 5000 villagers gathered and marched to 
Pasuruan city, where they occupied the alun-alun and refused to leave until the resident had heard 
their complaints and demands.275 Van Nes, in fear of a major revolt, immediately started corresponding 
with Buitenzorg to gain advice. He received a rather lame answer of Baud (then Governor-General ad 
interim in absence of Van den Bosch, who had just left for an inspection journey to Sumatra). Baud 
advised Van Nes to contact Major General Frans David Cochius (commander of the Dutch East-Indian 
Army since 1832) for further assistance, and urged him not to use violence.276 Apparently, Baud 
considered sending in the experienced resident Burchard Elias of Cirebon (1842-1845, in office 1830-
1838) to intermediate, and wrote a letter to Van den Bosch, which he considered “quite the sufficient 
steps that could be taken for the moment.”277 It is not very clear what exactly happened the next few 
days, but apparently, van Nes succeeded in appeasing the situation without much support of the 
Government-General.278 He invited two representatives of the rebellious group to question them 
about their complaints, and a few days later the villagers received a letter from van Nes in which he 
promised change and no extension of sugar cultivation until stated otherwise, after which the villagers 
returned to their desas.279 
For Van Nes, the most important question was about who had initiated and organized the revolt. 
A group of villagers was arrested days after the revolt. In one of his letters to the Governor-General he 
immediately expressed suspicions of “evil agitations by disgruntled Chinese and Javanese who had not 
been able to acquire their desired sugar contracts.”280 Soon, the prime suspect in this case became the 
brother of the former regent and uncle of the current regent, known by the Dutch as ‘Demang Raden 
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Pandja Tedja Koesoemo’, (Demang Raden Panji Tejakusuma). Tejakusuma had been fired from his post 
as Demang of ‘Kebontjandie’ (Keboncandi; see map 4) by van Nes earlier in 1833 because of 
drunkenness and misbehaviour and was suspected to have had plenty of motives to take revenge and 
to show off power to his population.281 During the summer of 1833, Tejakusuma was reported to have 
travelled to all districts in the residency in “a very secret manner”, “hiding from Dutch officials.”282 
According to the Dutch files, he had a great deal of influence on large parts of the regencies of 
Pasuruan, since he was able to speak Javanese as well as Madurese and knew most local heads and 
lots of the villagers personally.283 Being a brother of a regent, he still possessed power in the eyes of 
the population, no matter if the Dutch expelled him from his official functions. Van Nes was well aware 
of that, and suspected the former Demang of abetting to take revenge for his dismissal.284 Surely, 
Tejakusuma had felt aversion against the Dutch and it is possible that he regarded his noble position 
as a Demang, which he obtained from the predecessor of Van Nes, in different terms than the Dutch 
did.  
The Dutch brought the former Demang to Surabaya for detainment a few days after the revolt for 
further questioning, together with a group of 23 ‘disobedient’ villagers that were accused of 
involvement in the protest, under suspicion of “bad behaviour” and theft.285 There, the judge 
confronted him with being spotted sneaking around in the districts of Rejasa, Widongan, Keboncandi, 
Ngempit and Gemping in Pasuruan. The ex-Demang explained that he only wanted to buy sugar and 
bamboo for the celebration of Mawlid (the celebration of Mohammed’s birthday) in the district of 
Widongan, and had to travel through the other districts to get there.286 When he visited a Chinese 
sugar mill owner in Windongan he was caught by a controleur der cultures, who was coincidentally 
around to carry out a standard inspection.287 According to the controleur, the ex-Demang suspiciously 
hid himself from him, but the Demang himself claimed that instead of hiding he was just trying to 
capture his dog that had run away.288 Though this obviously sounded much like a pretext, it was difficult 
for the judge to disregard the denial of the ex-Demang. During the interrogation, the ex-Demang 
repeatedly denied all involvement, claimed that he was just being defamed by his political rivals, 
appealed to the good relation he had with the former resident of Pasuruan, and stated that he was 
completely in favour of the Dutch regime and that he regretted having a worsening relation with the 
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current resident Van Nes.289  He also eagerly pointed out that his nephew, the regent, was “very 
arrogant and proud, and contrary to the former regent dissociated himself from and did not enjoy the 
thrust and love of the villagers, who were extremely dissatisfied with him”, and “was also too young 
to be a capable regent anyway.”290 The judge continued questioning the arrested villagers, who all told 
him completely different and contradictory stories, often blaming each other with the wildest 
accusations. Most of them denied any involvement and claimed to be very satisfied with the situation 
in Pasuruan and their workload. Some of them blamed Demang Tejakusuma for provoking people in 
the villages, while others defended the Demang’s actions and blamed the other Demangs and their 
fellow captive villagers of false accusations to make their own case look better.291  Some of them, like 
a certain Pa Ngadisa (Pak Ngadisa; mister Ngadisa) from the desa of Grongon even denied really 
knowing Tejakusuma at all (which is not very likely; middle-high ranking nobles like Demangs were 
usually well-known throughout the residency, especially when they took the effort of travelling 
around).292 When the judge confronted the villagers and the Demang with each other’s contradicting 
statements, they kept coming up with other excuses. The frustrated judge wrote to Van Nes that 
though he shared the suspicions against the Demang and some of the villagers, he was not able to 
prove the accusations. The Demang was set free and relocated to the residency of Rembang, while 
Van Nes was still convinced of his involvement.293 The case of the villagers was somewhat more 
problematic: sending them back to their villagers was problematic; they could instigate revenge or 
stimulate the rebellious mood, so in 1834 it was decided to exile them all to residency of Krawang in 
West-Java, far away from Pasuruan.294 
Striking is the response of the other Demangs in Pasuruan and the stance they take against their 
own villagers. First of all, it was only because of their cooperation that these villagers could have been 
arrested and brought to Surabaya.295 In the translated letters they send to the Dutch government in 
Pasuruan, they all stated that they were happy to have gotten rid of “these terrible bandits and 
robbers, who always caused trouble and never obeyed their commands.”296 The Demangs accused 
them of not having a steady job, being sources of ‘unrest’, provoking other peasants to stop planting 
sugar cane, and plotting against the government.  They were stereotyped as overly violent 
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troublemakers with “terlalu branie” (much swagger).297  One of the Demangs even expressed hope 
that ‘his’ captured villagers were to be expelled from his district.298 These Demangs sought cover in the 
Dutch legal system, anxious to get involved in the prosecutions and actually made cunning use of the 
Dutch system to get rid of alarmingly assertive villagers and possible future competitors or rivals, who, 
by revolting against the Dutch, showed a very disturbing disobedience to them. 
In Pasuruan, one of the most important sugar-producing residencies, and eventually over the 
whole of Java, the revolt had some impact during the next years. The fired Demang was not proven 
guilty, much to the frustrations of Van Nes. Several Chinese sugar mill owners were accused of 
involvement, but this could not be proven as well and it remained unclear how the villagers organized 
themselves and who had taken the lead during the revolt. The Hague acknowledged the problem of 
overexpansion of the sugar fields and the consequences this had for the peasants. Possibilities to get 
every single peasant within a radius of half-an hour walking of a sugar mill were investigated, but no 
sugar factories were closed during the next two years.299 Eventually Van Nes himself initiated several 
reforms in the planting of sugar, and called for timely and honest payments, better working conditions 
and further advancement in the growing of sugar cane without affecting the rice fields. Most 
important, he promised the villagers to prevent further expansions of sugar production in the near 
future. The same year the Raad van Indië acknowledged his measures.300 Van den Bosch urged 
advancements in technological improvements and education of peasants, but most of the reforms in 
Pasuruan seemed to have been undertaken by Van Nes himself.301 However, the sugar production in 
Pasuruan never seemed to have suffered deeply during the next few years: in 1835 it was reported 
that the production surpassed even “the wildest expectations”, and indeed it had doubled the 
production quota.302 
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Further interpretations and the significance of the Pasuruan revolt 
Sugar cultivation had indeed been introduced and expanded in Pasuruan with strong zeal and vigour; 
the soil and climate in this residency were unusually favourable for growing sugar and the efforts of 
Van Nes and his predecessor Hendrik Jacob Domis (1782-1842) in organising sugar production 
supported the development of sugar into a major export commodity.303 Van Nes was a hardliner 
concerning handling those elements in the local elite who could keep up to his standards. To avoid the 
people being exposed to the oppressions and extortions of the chiefs, Van Nes used a policy of 
discharging any indigenous officials who did not follow his exact standards of efficient agricultural 
management.304 Van den Bosch was so impressed by the role of Van Nes in rearranging the internal 
political situation in Yogyakarta and Surakarta in 1830 and his skills in controlling the Pasuruan 
rebellion, that he proposed him for the position of Governor-General.305 Baud however had some 
sincere objections against Van Nes because of his recent divorce, which had apparently caused public 
gossiping in Batavia about the “morality of man and wife.”306 Van Nes, according to Baud, “had lived 
with a wife of one of his superiors”, and therefore Baud was unsure if a man of such “impurity” was 
deemed fit for the highest position in the colonial government.307 
The shallow support of the Government-General to Van Nes during the revolt might therefore 
have something to do with the absence of Van den Bosch. Baud, not yet as experienced as Van den 
Bosch and reserved against Van Nes was not certain how to respond to the panicked messages from 
Pasuruan and therefore only send advice to consult with officials nearby for diplomatic or military 
assistance. Apparently, Van Nes was also not well prepared for such an unexpected outburst of 
emotions, and could only pander to the villagers demands. On top of that, accepting the complaints of 
the Javanese peasants was problematic, which relates to the reason why the Demang was arrested 
and accused of abetment. Van Deventer, who had worked as a civil servant in Pasuruan for seven years 
in the 1840s, identified the revolt in Pasuruan as a clear testimony against the very nature of the 
Cultivation system.308 The peasants protested against the heavy work-load, which was played down by 
the Government-General prior to and after the revolt. Subtraction from landrent payments and 
indifference and detachment of the regents towards their own population was already observed and 
identified by the local governments, but ignored.309 The official view of the Government-General, in 
accordance with Van den Bosch’ personal ideas, was that the Javanese population and regents were 
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incapable of organizing agricultural production of cash crops themselves without Dutch guidance. 
Often the reports of agricultural production from Buitenzorg on the Minister of Colonies’ desk mention 
the “indifference”, “lack of knowledge” and “ignorance” of the regents and peasants when it came to 
planting and harvesting of sugar, coffee and in particular indigo.310 This strengthened Van den Bosch 
in his belief in a liberal policy adapted to the character and institutions of the Javanese.311 Van Nes 
agreed with Van den Bosch on this subject.312 He had concerns about the morality and ethics of the 
heads, as before the 1833 revolt he had received complaining peasants more than once, whom 
contrary to the heads he considered “active and manageable.”313 Van Nes was able to negotiate his 
way out of the public unrest, but never really trusted the regents, and suspected them of intentional 
distortions and abuse of the system.314 According to Baud, the revolt was most obviously attributable 
to the “promptings of some evildoers.” Though a few “overzealous” servants might have 
overburdened the village communities by allowing too fast expansions of the sugar fields, the director 
of cultivations in Pasuruan assured him that even taking into account the recent unrest, “nowhere the 
cultivation system would meet serious resistance by the peasants when the initial and obvious 
difficulties are overcome.”315 Resident Van Nes therefore needed a scapegoat, to cover up the uprising 
problems and defend the continuity of the cultivation system in Pasuruan. Although Van Nes and the 
judge in Surabaya made a solid case against Demang Tejakusuma, his involvement in the rebellion 
should only be seen as part of wider dissatisfactions. 
4.2 Disruptions in Cirebon 
 
The Pasuruan-case was not the first time the Government-General blamed ‘evildoers’ for causing rural 
unrests. In Cirebon 1830 we find another case that shows very clearly how unrests could sharpen local 
and inter-local relations, and affect the debate about the efficacy of the cultivation system. In the 
beginning of December 1830, a small group of peasants in the desa ‘Istana Sangar’ refused to continue 
working in the indigo fields, which threatened to cause ‘unrest’ in the entire residency.316 Though easily 
resolved by exiling those that were held responsible, the aftermath of the unrest caused some early 
debate on the actual implementation of indigo cultivation. Apparently Merkus and Adriaan de Salis 
(1788-1834, resident of Kedu in 1830), both members of the Raad van Indië, started corresponding 
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with the resident of Cirebon, Elias, sharing their concerns about the latest expansions of the indigo-
fields, which they both considered the most important cause for the unrest.317 In a resolution of June 
1831 (incorporated in Van Deventer’s ‘Bijlagen’) dealing with the situation in Cirebon, Van den Bosch 
showed great discontent about this practice and subtly reminded his colleagues that “the supervision 
of all servants is the responsibility of the Governor-General (…), and communication with the residents 
and other officials should always happen under his supervision.”318 Van den Bosch was eager to point 
out, just as in the case of Pasuruan, that the unrest was the result of abetments of the Kuwu (village 
chief) of the desa Pegagan, who was immediately exiled to Banda. Van den Bosch clearly did not 
appreciate the fundaments of the cultivation system being related to the chaotic disruptions of 1830. 
He rather pointed at agricultural mismanagement of the regents (most of whom were still untrained 
in cash-crop cultivation), or overenthusiasm or even unprofessionalism by Dutch officials.319 The 
principles of the cultivation system were holy, and questioning them in their earliest stage was 
unacceptable for him.  
According to van Deventer, the complaints by the Javanese peasants were unreliable, as “it was a 
Javanese habit to express the exact opposite of one’s true motivations.”320 Vitalis, assistant-resident 
of Cirebon at the time, claimed that under the pressure of the latest expansions some local regents, 
who had managed to use the cultivation system completely to their own advantage though distortions 
and methods of exploitation, heavily lost influence and grip on the production of indigo.321 They 
therefore started all kinds of intrigues, such as ordering the cultivation of indigo on the villages’ rice 
fields, the exact same thing the peasants in Pasuruan complained about in 1834. So the argument of 
Van den Bosch and loyal residents like Van Nes points to troublemakers and evildoers as scapegoats, 
while such critics as Merkus and De Salis are seen as trying to take political benefit from the events by 
attacking Van den Bosch’ brainchild. Considering this, arguments such as those of Vitalis, which focus 
on the political games of intrigues played by the regents and residents, are more convincing and 
aligned with the daily practice of government routine. In this light, it is interesting to know that ten 
years later the production of indigo in Cirebon was terminated due to disappointing results and 
massive resistance by the peasantry.322 Likely, something was wrong with indigo production, but it 
took the colonial government ten years to acknowledge this. Very interesting as well is that in the 
annual report of Cirebon of 1830, the unrest is mentioned but not elaborated on. It appears that in the 
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resolution of 1831 Van den Bosch ordered to keep the affair secret and that “the papers of the 
investigation should all be sent to the Governor-General, and that the concerns the research might 
have raised could be disposed of.”323 Clearly the political game, with the continuation of the cultivation 
system at stake, had started, and apparently Van den Bosch and his opponents were well prepared to 
play it dirty. 
Any obstinacy of the allies was eagerly adopted by opponents of Van den Bosch as an argument 
against his system. This is one of the reasons that disruption of peace was something that had to be 
regulated and dealt with immediately. Rather than deviating from the pre-set course, Van den Bosch, 
and with him several important officials and residents, used abetments of troublemakers and evildoers 
as an explanation of the obstinacy of their allies. Unrest was interpreted in a beforehand determined 
colonial conception, into which the actual reality was crammed in order ‘to save the system.’ At the 
same time, native rulers used the Dutch bureaucratic system in their own favour and had a fluent and 
dynamic notion of adat, as both Van den Bosch and Baud were aware of.324 Reading between the lines 
shows that central control and regional control were more separated than Van den Bosch allowed 
anyone to admit. Openly accepting the occasional failure of indirect colonial control would have been 
“incompatible with the pretence of absolute social dominance.”325 
4.3. Improvements in control? Murder on Sumatra 
 
Giving the cases described above, one might wonder why the control of what in a later era was called 
“the cork that kept the Netherlands afloat” was left to a handful of half-heartedly trained ‘improvisers’, 
controlled by a Government-General that seemed not to have been able to carry out an undisputed 
policy. No matter how pragmatic or politically cunning some of the residents were, colonial governance 
on Java in the early 1830s was based on a symbiotic relation with noblemen that continuously tried to 
abuse the core and pushed hard against the limits of the system for their own advantage. Old rivalries 
continued, and the presence of the Dutch became an extra instrument as shown by the Pasuruan-case. 
Dutch policy towards higher nobles needed to be prudent, and posed no immediate threat to the 
existent internal political hierarchy. The regents were simply too important. Stimulated by disruptions 
as described above, the urge to reform the relations with the regents increased during the 1830s. An 
expressive example of these urges can be found in a report of M. Francis, the Adjudant Komnmisaris 
Inspecteur voor de buiten-Etablissementen of Sumatra (the assistant commissary-inspector for the 
outer-territories), to be found in the National Archives of the Netherlands in the Hague.  
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The report narrates how the assistant-resident of Bencoolen, named Julius Hendrik Knoerle, was 
murdered by a crowd in a country house at the outer coffee plantations near Bencoolen in the summer 
of 1833.326 Knoerlem who had been the personal adjutant of Van den Bosch prior to his appointment 
as assistant-resident of Bencoolen, is described by Francis as a terribly unpopular assistant-resident, 
who fuelled the hate of the heads and population in his residency against the Dutch by intimidating 
the local population and behaving aggressively. A few days before he was murdered, he demanded 
that a grandson of the regent of Soengi Lamoen327 delivered him a kerbau (buffalo) on very short notice 
(for unknown reasons). When this grandson failed to do so on time Knoerle had him arrested and his 
house set on fire (in fact, some eye-witnesses stated that he even lit the fire himself).328 Family 
members of the grandson died in the fire and all his possession were burned. On another occasion, 
Knoerle fined and slapped another regent in the face when this regent held a wedding party for which 
Knoerle had not given his permission. The stay of Knoerle at the poorly protected house near the coffee 
plantation combined with these two events provided the immediate inducement for the people to 
murder him and his two (Sumatrese) sentinels.329 Though Francis and his superior, Van Sevenhoven, 
agreed on taking strict measures (such as putting high bounties on the heads of the murderers and 
requesting extra military assistance), and though they took notice of the “illness” (probably malaria, 
which might have affected his mental stability) Knoerle had suffered from the months prior to his 
murder, they clearly stated in their reports that the aggressive behaviour of Knoerle was extremely 
harmful to the Dutch cause.330 A letter from Van Sevenhoven, at that time Regeringscommisaris 
(Government Commissioner, Dutch representative in the outer territories) of Padang, to The Hague, 
intensely criticized the “rash behaviour of a civil servant” (referring to Knoerle), claiming that the 
government itself was the main victim.331 Van Sevenhoven expressed the desire of “treating the 
regents and other heads on Java more openly, as, in order to unite their interest with that of the Dutch, 
it was paramount not to insult them or hurt their authority in any way.” He thought it was a simple 
necessity to learn to “understand their religious principles as well as their domestic organizations, 
morals, habits and adat, and make Dutch rule indispensable for them, which can only take place by 
kindness towards them and act with wisdom.”332 Therefore Van Sevenhoven plead fiercely for not only 
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buiten-Etablissementen aan kommissaris van gouvernement over Sumatra’s westkust, J.I. van Sevenhoven”, 
Benkulen, 25 August, 1833. See also: Van Deventer, ‘Bijlagen XX’: 480-2 and Fasseur, De Indologen: 81-2. 
327 Literary “The river Lamun”, most likely a small area around a small river then known as Lamoen or Lamun, 
which is no longer traceable.  
328 NA: Koloniën 4233: ‘N74’, 9 April 1834: “Brief”, Benkulen, 25 August 1833. 
329 Ibidem. 
330 Fasseur, De Indologen: 82. 
331 NA Koloniën: 4233: “Brief N68”, 17 March 1834: “Brief van J.I. van Sevenhoven aan de Minister van 
Koloniën”, Padang, 11 November 1833. 
332 NA Koloniën: 4233: “Brief N68”. 
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improving education home and abroad, but also for selecting those civil servants with “gentle 
characters.”333 
The case of Knoerle is set in a completely different scene than Java: apart from the difference in 
peoples and cultures Dutch power was considerably weaker on Sumatra. The wars with the religiously 
inspired Padri’s (early 1800s-1837) prevented the Dutch from getting a stable foothold on the inner 
parts of the island. Still, precisely in these areas diplomacy was crucial to secure stable relations with 
local rulers. Obviously Knoerle’s aggression only worsened the opportunities to reach a peace, security 
and control on Sumatra, hence Van Sevenhoven’s harsh judgment. 
4.4 The paradoxes of shared authority 
 
Fasseur sees a ‘colonial paradox’ primarily in the Dutch political ideology of maintaining peaceful 
relations with the heads and people around the Dutch power holders, in contrast to the practice of 
expansion of the Dutch state on and outside Java.334 However, the internal paradoxes in the distorted 
relation of the central government with local, badly trained officials can be noticed even more. Most 
residents could only give shape to rule in their own manners, according to their own perceptions, 
‘investigative modalities’ or ‘idioms’, which led to totally different responses by native rulers as 
exemplified by the divergent cases of Van Nes and Knoerle. The diplomatic approach of Van Nes and 
the aggressive style of Knoerle are both grounded on the same lack of centrally organized pragmatism. 
Governance founded on cooperation with the regents depended on the character and personal 
qualities of the residents and the willingness of the regents to cooperate. The Government-General’s 
response towards aggression and violence by colonial servants (either Dutch or Javanese) was forceful 
intervention; bearing in mind the shock of the Java War, maintenance of peace and order formed the 
ultimate credo of settling governance within the framework of the cultivation system. The behaviour 
of Knoerle fell outside this framework, and in this case, the people responded before the Government-
General could act. 
Reality-checks like the murder of Knoerle put continuous tension on Dutch rule, but at the same 
time increased the urge for improvement. The more capable residents, like Van Nes and Elias, resolved 
most difficulties diplomatically. Those residents that used their eyes and ears and possessed the 
cunning to operate within the indigenous network, by  making use of the best elements of traditional 
and legal rule, were able to keep most difficulties and uprisings under control. Hard, cruel involvement 
in less stable areas where cooperation in local information networks did not yet exist proved to be 
unrewarding. By operating carefully and eliminating less cooperative nobles, stability could be 
                                                          
333 Ibidem. 
334 Fasseur, De weg naar het paradijs en andere Indische geschiedenissen (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1995): 47-
8. 
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remained. Only by being aware of who was who in the complicated landscape of Javanese noblemen 
was manipulation possible during situations of ‘unrest’. Only within his own safely created network 
was a resident able to exercise his influence in the early years of colonial governance. 
The absence of a well-defined blueprint caused the central and regional governments on Java to 
intervene in the social framework with ‘local pragmatism’, applied to the situation as it was, based on 
decisions taken in the heat of the moment. The public administration functioned based on patrimonial 
principles constructed on the intertwined interests and methods of the Dutch and the Javanese. The 
constant vacillating policy of the Dutch created room for the regents, Demangs and village chiefs to 
impair the roots of the cultivation system which caused the disruptions that could only be resolved by 
disregarding Van den Bosch’ principles, using a carefully constructed but yet vulnerable information 
network.335 By negotiating hesitantly with the regents and forcefully intervening when needed – exiling 
those isolated elements that could be disposed of was the most important instrument – colonial rule 
was divided and defined. When a situation really got out of hand, disruptions and unrest that emerged 
in its meeting point demonstrate the distrust of the Dutch against their Javanese counterparts. This 
tension, between the intertwined relation of mutual interests and distrusts, stresses the paradox of 
carrying out a combination of native and colonial authority. 
  
                                                          
335 Breman, Control of land and labour: 6. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the 1830s, the cultivation system of Van den Bosch provided in an ideological framework that 
seemed to be a sophisticated form of indirect rule. In this thesis, I tried to emphasize that this was not 
the case, and that, indeed, indirect rule was rather hypothetical than pragmatic. The residents were 
not able follow the ideal type of Van den Bosch. Instead, they sought and found their own ways in 
dealing with the demands of their superiors in the colonial centre and the obstinacies of the native 
rulers in the provinces. 
Local governance on Java in the early colonial era has not yet received the attention it deserves. 
Heated scholarly and non-scholarly debates about the positive and negative effects of colonial 
exploitation on the economic and political development of Java alywas remained morally inspired and 
repetitive, without moving the discussion much forward. Moreover, no major studies have focused 
directly on the actual practice of colonial governance during the first stage of the formation of the 
Dutch colonial state. Sutherland, Van den Doel, Fasseur and others have touched upon important 
matters concerning the sources and effects of close cooperation between the Binnenlands Bestuur 
and the Inlands Bestuur. But the crucial connection between the residents and regents, the actual 
platform for the practice of local governance, has remained undiscovered. Historians so far focussed 
on describing processes of change on a long term, without emphasizing the importance of the 1830s. 
I consider these years to have been the formative years of the establishment of colonial governance in 
the Dutch East Indies. 
As explained, the background and effects of Van den Bosch’ ideology and policy and cannot be 
understood without having knowledge of first, the interaction the VOC showed with local rulers on 
Java in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, and second, the reforms of Daendels and Raffles 
which had side-lined those rulers. The policy-changes of Daendels and Raffles during the early 
nineteenth century created the problems Van den Bosch was determined to solve. To the Dutch king, 
Van den Bosch was the ideal trouble-shooter, whose leadership had proven valuable in the homeland 
and the colonies in the west. For the regents, his plan provided an opportunity to regain power and 
accumulate more wealth and political influence. Based on Raffles’ administrative reforms, Van den 
Bosch created the very first format of provincial governance by a residency-system. But he had never 
been a resident himself. Because of the administrative distance between centre and periphery, or 
Government-General and residents, the local situation was hard to assess for the central government 
in Batavia. The colonial ideology did simply not reach down to every outer corner of the island, because 
the reality in the provinces was so different from what the Government-General imagined. This created 
various forms of exercise of colonial authority, in which contrary to the ideal of distant, bureaucratic, 
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institutionalized governance, the Dutch residents were compelled to closely take part in the local 
political scenes, shaping their own mixed version of direct and indirect rule. Contact with the regents 
was crucial, and the willingness of the regents to cooperate depended on the social skills and personal 
experience of the resident. To manage the relation with the Javanese indigenous elite, the residents 
used various techniques. Large-scale information networks based on correspondence, observation and 
occasional espionage generated precious local knowledge, used reciprocally by both the regent and 
resident to manipulate the social orders of the colonial and native world. By taking part in the delicacies 
of Javanese court-diplomacy, using hormat-traditions, the residents were able to communicate even 
without being fluent in the local languages. In lack of professional education, the residents relied on 
their own experiences and skills. The most capable residents were those who were able to put aside 
their immediate distrust against the native world and were able to communicate with the regents by 
taking part in the local traditions and playing the political games of intrigue, espionage and diplomacy. 
The mind-set of the Java War made the Dutch extremely careful in their approach towards the 
Javanese nobility; regents were replaced or fired only when considered unavoidable, and usually as an 
instrument in local political games, taking advantage of local rivalries. But as shown by the cases of 
Grobogan and Pasuruan, this was a tricky game, and though Van den Bosch expressed great confidence 
in the Dutch capabilities of governing Java in the case of the exile of Mangkudiningrat II and 
Prabudiningrat, the success of his policy fully depended not on his ideological framework, but on the 
cunningness and capabilities of his residents.  
The lack of pragmatism in Van den Bosch’ ideology, and consequently the various strategies and 
techniques of governance used by the residents explains why historiographical terms like ‘direct’ and 
‘indirect rule’ cannot reflect reality. The endeavours of the residents did not express colonial 
domination, nor a mentality of abstinence, but showed that the boundaries in the relation between 
the Dutch colonizing official and Javanese colonized noble were permeable and shifting. Every regent 
was both an ally and a possible threat. But no matter how potentially perilous the position of the 
regents was, to the Dutch their traditional authority was essential in claiming authority and controlling 
the peasant masses. The paradox of early colonial governance is that Van den Bosch’ system created 
not an institutionalized, but a patrimonial political system. The local colonial networks of the 1830s 
remind us strongly of the model Anderson and Schrieke used to explain the principles of Javanese 
indigenous rule: a decentralized form of governance, based on personal experience and pragmatism, 
where informal, patrimonial relations mattered more than institutions and regulations. Though not 
based on kinship, the importance of personal contact, the gap between centre and province, the lack 
of professional education, and the interference of residents in non-bureaucratic uses such as gift-
exchange and awarding of titles make Dutch colonial rule in the early 1830s very much comparable to 
the precolonial situation on Java. This changed during the following decades under influence of 
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stronger involvement of the Dutch government, the construction and institutionalization of 
educational facilities, and various socio-political, technical and economic transformations. With that, 
the whole nature of colonial governance and the ideology behind the cultivation system changed. 
Eventually the system was abolished in 1870, but by then it had already undergone such profound 
changes it probably would have been barely recognizable to Van den Bosch or any colonial servant 
working on Java in the 1830s. 
The practice of colonial governance remains an intriguing topic. In many cases it appears to be 
paradoxical and confusing. The residency-archives in Jakarta never seem to provide a complete and 
veracious picture. The intrigues and political games residents played with regents have left files that 
are informative concerning the colonial reality, but also very subjective and pragmatic, which makes 
the colonial world as represented in the archives hard to grasp. But when we remain aware of the aims 
and interests of the officials who compiled the archives, they are fascinating and give us the closest 
and most complete view possible on the actual, everyday reality of colonial governance. We should 
therefore give these archives the attention they deserve. They are about colonial practice instead of 
policy-making, and display unique perspectives and invaluable insights into the daily routine of 
colonialism we may otherwise not know of. Creating more knowledge about this very routine of 
colonial governance will be the next step in developing a more complete picture of colonial rule. 
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Appendix 1: Javanese titles and ranks 
  
                                                          
336 Van den Berg, Inlandsche rangen en titels: 1-6. 
337 These titles can be awarded to a native ruler by either the Dutch Government or a higher native ruler, but in 
general are received by birth right. Van den Berg, Inlandsche rangen en titles: 2. 
338 Titles that are only used in combination with (immediately preceding or following) one of the above-
mentioned titles, in this case indicating a noble rank, but not nobility or a noble position. These titles were used 
by the Javanese as administrative titles, but the Dutch Government started to use and award these to indicate 
bureaucratic ranks. 
339 Settled with the resolution of 9 May 1820, No. 6. See: Van den Berg, Inlandsche rangen en titles: 8. 
Van den Berg  
Classification336 
Title Translation/meaning Dutch interpretation 
    
Royal titles Susuhunan Emperor Emperor 
 Sultan King King 
 Panembahan Title for certain members 
of the royal family 
Prince, king 
 Pangeran Prince Prince 
 Ratu ‘Ruler’, queen Queen 
    
Noble titles337 Pangeran Prince Prince 
 
Occasionally to this  
title the military rank 
of ‘Colonel’ was linked 
 Ratu ‘Ruler’, queen  
 Raden ‘Lord’, king Lord, king 
 Mas Form of address Noble title/predicative 
    
Administrative titles Bupati Landruler Regent 
 Patih ‘Vizir’, chief minister Vizir, chief-minister 
 Jaxa   
 Wedono Minister, chief District head 
 Demang Middle-ranking noble, tax-
collector 
District head 
 Mantri Minister Minister 
 Rangga Administrative title  
    
Predicative titles338 Adipati Lord Noblemen, ‘duke’, title 
awarded to regents 
 
To this title the 
military rank of 
‘Lieutenant-Colonel’ 
was linked339 
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Note: The use of these titles and ranks (between which the difference is not always clear) was subject to frequent 
change, as administrative titles could become noble, and honorifics could become titles. Different titles could 
thus be used in different manners, depending on time and place. Under Dutch influence, predicative titles and 
honorifics were administratively regulated. Most regents held the title of Raden (which always remained purely 
a noble, hereditary title), by birth, and thus styled themselves Raden Adipati, Raden Tummengung or Raden 
Ngabehi, depending on the administrative rank they received from the Dutch. Regents who proved very loyal or 
capable were awarded with the title of Pangeran. Royal and noble titles were always hereditary, while the 
heredity of administrative and predicative titles differed per place (bendara was for example hereditary in 
Malayan kingdoms, but not on Java). 
  
                                                          
340 These titles do not hold any legitimizing meaning in themselves, but are used among inferior nobles to 
address or talk about superior nobles, as a predicative preceding the ‘main’ title. 
341 Non-hereditary titles, not used to indicate noble or administrative ranks nor attached to other titles, but 
used as personal awards to express courtesy or stress the glory of a ruler. 
 Title Translation/meaning Dutch interpretation 
 
    
 Arya High ranking official High ranking official 
 Panji High noble title Noble title 
 Ngabehi ‘Commander’, 
administrative title 
High ranking official, 
awarded to regents 
 
To this title the 
military rank of 
‘Captain’ was linked 
 Demang Middle-ranking noble, tax-
collector 
District head 
 Rangga Predicative administrative 
title 
 
Noble title 
    
Honorifics340 Gusti Lord Noble title 
 Bendara Vizir, prime advisor of a 
Sultan 
Administrative title 
 Kanjeng Noble honorific Noble title 
 Paduka Noble honorific Noble title 
    
Courtesy titles341 Kyai Honorific for senior nobles Noble title 
 Tuwan Honorific, master Noble 
title/predicative, 
master, lord 
 Bagus Honorific 
 
Lord, noble 
predicative 
 Mas Honorific, form of address Noble 
title/predicative 
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Appendix 2: Explanatory list of persons 
 
In this appendix a list of Governor-Generals for the relevant period of this thesis: from the 
reorganizations of Daendels to the term of Pieter Merkus. In addition a list of the Dutch officials in 
service in the 1830s and their careers, and a list of the Javanese nobles, chiefs, and native servants, 
mentioned in this thesis. 
1. Governor-Generals of the Dutch East Indies (1808-1844)342 
Under Napoleonic rule   
1808-1811  Herman Willem Daendels 
1811  Jan Willem Janssens 
Under British governance, 1811-1816 
   
1811  Gilbert Elliot-Murray-Kynynmound, first Earl of Minto 
1811-1816  Thomas Raffles 
1816  John Fendall 
Governors-General of the Dutch East Indies under the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1816-1844 
   
1816-1826  Godert Alexander Gerard Philip van der Capellen 
1826  Hendrik Merkus de Kock 
1826-1830  Leonard Pierre Joseph du Bus de Gisignies 
1830-1834  Johannes van den Bosch (see below) 
1833-1836  Jean Chrétien Baud (see below) 
1836-1840  Dominique Jacques de Eerens 
1840-1841  Carel Sirardus Willem van Hogendorp 
1841-1844  Pieter Merkus (see below) 
 
  
                                                          
342 See: Van Goor, De Nederlandse koloniën: 382. 
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2. Dutch colonial officials   
Name and dates Functions in the Dutch East Indies  
 
Baud, Jean Chrétien  
(1789-1859) 343 
 
- 2nd clerk (“Tweede Commies”) in Batavia 
(in Dutch and later British service) 
- 2nd translator (“Tweede Translateur”) in 
Batavia 
- Chief clerk of the British Government 
Secretariat in Batavia (“Hoofdcommies 
Britse Gouvernementssecretarie te Batavia”) 
- Government Secretary in Batavia 
(“Gouvernements-Secretaris te Batavia”) 
- Secretary of the Government-General 
(“Algemeene Secretaris van de Hooge 
Regeering” te Batavia) 
Returned to the Netherlands 
- Functionary at the ministry of Colonies in 
The Hague 
- Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies 
- Minister of Colonies 
- Member of Parliament 
 
1810-1811 
 
1812-1814 
 
1814-1816 
 
 
1816-1819 
 
1819-1821 
 
 
1822-1824 
1824-1832 
 
1833-836 
1840-1848 
1850-1858 
 
Bosch, Johannes van den 
(1780-1844)344 
 
- Lieutenant of Engineers 
- Adjutant of the Governor-General 
- Captain of Engineers 
- Adjutant of the Governor-General 
Returned to the Netherlands, diverse 
military and non-military functions 
- Commissioner-General of the West Indies 
- Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies 
- Commissioner-General of the Dutch East 
Indies 
- Minister of Colonies 
- Member of Parliament 
 
1798-1801 
1801-1802 
1802-1804 
1804-1808 
1808-1827 
 
1827-1828 
1830-1833 
1832-1834 
 
1834-1840 
1842-1844 
                                                          
343 Hugenholtz, Het geheim van Paleis Kneuterdijk; De wekelijkse gesprekken van koning Willem II met zijn 
minister J.C. Baud over het koloniale beleid en de herziening van de grondwet 1841-1848 (Verhandelingen van 
het KITLV 239; Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008) See also: 
http://www.parlementairdocumentatiecentrum.nl/id/vg09lkxrbnwk [5-11-2014]. 
344 See: http://www.parlement.com/id/vg09llsmwiwb/j_graaf_van_den_bosch [5-11-2014]. 
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Le Clercq, Pieter 
(1787-1839)345 
 
- Secretary of the Government-General 
- Resident of Kedu 
- Resident of the Preanger regencies 
- Resident of Cirebon 
- Governor of Moluccas 
- Resident of Semarang 
Returned to the Netherlands 
- Resident of the Preanger regencies 
 
?-1821 
1821-1825 
1825-1826 
1826-1827 
1827-1828 
1828-1834 
1834-1837 
1837-1839 
 
Deventer, Salomon van 
(1816-1891)346 
 
 
- Various unknown functions in Batavia 
- Editor in chief of the Javasche Courant 
- Chief Clerk of the Department of Goods and 
Civil Warehouses347 
- Secretary of the residency of Pasuruan 
- Assistant-resident of Buitenzorg 
- Inspector of Finances 
- Resident of Banyumas 
Returned to the Netherlands, and published 
his famous ‘Bijdragen tot de kennis van het 
landelijk stelsel op Java’ (1865-1866)  
- Resident of Pasuruan 
- Member of the Raad van Indië 
 
1839-1842 
1842-1844 
1844-1849 
 
1849-1857 
1857 
1857-1859 
1859-1860 
1862-1866 
 
 
1866 
1873-1876 
 
Domis, Hendrik Jacob 
(1782-1842)348 
 
- Inspector of Finances 
- Resident of Semarang 
- Resident of Pasuruan 
- Resident of Surabaya 
Published several books based on his years 
as a colonial servant. 
 
?-1809 
1809-1827 
1827-1831 
1831-1834 
 
Douwes Dekker, Eduard, alias 
Multatuli  
(1820-1887) 
 
- Clerk at the General Accounting Office 
(“Algemene Rekenkamer”) 
- Controleur at the Westcoast of Sumatra 
Suspended 
- Secretary of the resident of Karawang 
- Clerk (“Commies”) at the resident’s office of 
Bagelen 
 
1839-1842 
 
1842-1843 
1843-1845 
1845-1846 
1846-1848 
 
                                                          
345 A.J. van der Aa, Biographisch woordenboek der Nederlanden (Haarlem: J.J. van Brederode, 1874), Part 21-1: 
192; KITLV, Micro Neg. No. 647: ‘Namenlijst der residenten op Java en Madoera sinds 1816.’; Carey, The power 
of prophecy: 437, 916. 
346 Molhuysen and Blok, NNBW Part 8 (1930): 386. 
347 “Departement der Producten en Civiele Magazijnen.” Merged with the “Directie der cultures” into the 
“Departement of “Binnenlands Bestuur” in 1866. 
348 KITLV, 646 Namenlijst der residenten’; Van der Aa, Biographisch woordenboek 4: 242-3; Molhuysen and 
Blok, NNBW 1: 725-6. 
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- Secretary of Menado 
- Assistant-resident of Ambon 
Returned to the Netherlands 
- Assistant-resident of Lebak 
1848-1851 
1851-1852 
1852-1855 
1856 
 
 
Elias, Burchard Joan 
(1799-1871)349 
 
 
- Chief Clerk of the Algemene Secretarie in 
Batavia 
- Director of the Government Printing Office 
(ad interim)350 
- Secretary of the residency of Batavia 
- Secretary-General at Buitenzorg 
- Resident of Cirebon 
- Secretary-General Ministry of Colonies 
- Governor-General of Suriname and Curacao 
 
 
Dates 
uncertain 
 
 
 
1830-1833  
1838-1842 
1842-1845 
 
Knoerle, Julius Hendrik 
(?-1833)351 
 
- Lieutenant in the Dutch East Indian Army 
- Adjutant of Governor-General Van den 
Bosch 
- Assistant-resident of Benkulu 
 
?-1830 
1830-1831 
 
1831-1833 
 
Merkus, Pieter 
(1787-1844)352 
 
- Civil Servant 1st class (“Ambtenaar Eerste 
Klasse”) 
- Chief Clerk of the Algemene Secretarie in 
Batavia 
- Deputy Secretary-General of the Algemene 
Secretarie 
- Attorney General and “Advocaat-fiscaal” 
(Public Prosecutor) of the Supreme Court of 
Justice in Batavia 
- Governor of the Moluccas 
- President of the Supreme Court 
- Member of the Raad van Indië 
 
- Regeringscommisaris of de Vorstenlanden 
Returned to the Netherlands 
- Member of the Raad van Indië 
Under redundancy pay 
- Regeringscommisaris of Sumatra 
- Governor-General ad interim, Vice President 
of the Raad van Indië 
- Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies 
 
1815-1816 
 
1816-1817 
 
1817-1819 
 
1819-1822 
 
 
1822-1828 
1828-1829 
1829-1830, 
1830-1834 
1830 
1834-1836 
1834-1836 
1836-1838 
1839 
1840 
 
1841-1844 
                                                          
349 See: http://www.parlement.com/id/vg09lmg5pjzq/b_j_elias [4-11-2014]. See also: KITLV, 647: ‘Namenlijst 
der residenten.’ 
350 “’s Landsdrukkerij.” Government Printing Office in Batavia, existed from 1667 until 1899. 
351  Van Deventer, ‘Bijdragen XX’: 480; Fasseur, De Indologen: 81-2. 
352 Molhuysen and Blok, NNBW 2: 898-901. 
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Nahuys van Burgst, Huibert Gerard 
baron (1782-1858)353 
 
- Council of Finances and Domains354 
- Commissionair and Inspector of Roads and 
Postal Services (“Commissaris en inspecteur 
der wegen en posterijen”) 
- Administrator of Woods (“Administrateur 
der Houtbossen”) 
- Resident of Yogyakarta 
- Commissionair of the government of Borneo 
- Resident of Yogyakarta and Surakarta 
- Resident of Surakarta, Commissionair of the 
government of Yogyakarta 
Returned to the Netherlands 
- Member of the Raad van Indië, General-
Major titular 
 
1805-1807 
1809-1811 
 
 
1811 
 
1815-1818 
1819 
1818-1823 
1827-1831 
 
1831-1835 
1836-1838 
 
Nes, Johan Frederik Walraven van 
(1795-1874)355 
 
- Member of the Supreme Court of Justice in 
Batavia356 
- Assistent-resident of Surabaja  
- Resident of Yogyakarta357 
- Resident ad interim of Surakarta 
- Resident of Pasuruan 
Returned to the Netherlands 
- Resident of Semarang 
- Member of the Raad van Indië 
- Vice-President of the Raad van Indië 
 
1823-1826 
 
1826-1827 
1827-1830 
1830 
1831-1839 
1839-1842 
1842-1845 
1843-1851 
1851-1853 
 
Roux, Hendrik Martinus le 
(1795-?)358 
 
- Unknown 
- Assistant-Resident of Semarang 
- Resident of Semarang 
- Resident of Bangka 
- Returned to the Netherlands 
- Resident of Kediri 
 
 
-1831 
1831-1834 
?-1843 
1845-1856 
1846-1857 
                                                          
353 Molhuysen en Blok, NNBW 1: 1356-7. See also: J. Paulus (eds. et al.) Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië 
(2nd ed., The Hague/Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff/N.V. v/h. E.J. Brill, 1919), part 3: N-Soema: 5. Nahuys van Burgst 
returned to and stayed in the Netherlands for following years: 1807-1809, 1811-1815 18: 23-1827 and 1831-
1836. 
354 ‘Raad van Financiën en Domeinen.’ 
355 KITLV, 647: ‘Namenlijst der residenten.’ See also: 
http://genealogie.startpagina.nl/prikbord/4249182/17005137/re-walraven-van-nes-raad-nederlands-indie [4-
11-2014], KITLV 647, ‘Namenlijst der residenten’; KITLV, Collectie J.F.W. Nes, H 112: Suiker Kultuur 
Pasoeroewan 1832-1835, Neg. No. 259 /1, 259/2 and 259/3. 
356 Hooggerechtshof van Nederlands-Indië. 
357 For a full overview of the residents of Surakarta and Yogyakarta, see: Carey, The power of prophecy: 808-
810. 
358 KITLV 647, ‘Namenlijst der residenten’; Hugenholtz, Het geheim van Paleis Kneuterdijk: 172; Carey, The 
power of prophecy: 614, 942. 
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Salis, Adriaan Maurits Theodorus de 
(1786-1834)359 
 
- Private Secretary of Daendels 
- Various unknown functions 
- Resident of Surabaya 
- Resident of Yogyakarta and Surakarta 
Returned to the Netherlands 
- Resident of Kedu 
- Resident ad interim of Surabaya 
- Member of the Raad van Indië 
 
1802[?]-? 
?-1817 
1817-1820[?] 
1820[?]-1825 
1825-1826 
1826-1830[?] 
1830[?]-1834 
1830-1834 
 
Sevenhoven, Jan Isaak [Izaak] (van) 
(1782-1841)360 
 
- Advocaat-fiscaal of the Supreme Court of 
Justice in Batavia 
- Resident of Kedu 
- Resident of Cirebon 
- Regeringscommisaris of Palembang 
- Resident of Surakarta 
- Resident of Yogyakarta 
- Regeringscommisaris of de Vorstenlanden 
- Resident of Cirebon 
- Resident of Yogyakarta 
- Directeur der cultures 
- Member of the Raad van Indië 
- Regeringscommisaris of Padang 
 
1815-1817 
 
1817-1818 
1818-1821, 
1821 and 1826 
1824-1825 
1825-1827 
1830 
1827-1830 
1830 
1831 
1832 
1833 
 
Vitalis, Louis (Ludovico)361 
(Dates unknown) 
 
- Superintendent of Incomes (“Opziener der 
Landelijke Inkomsten”) in the residency of 
Cirebon 
- Controller of Rural Incomes (“Controleur der 
Landelijke Inkomsten”) in Cirebon 
- Assistant-resident in the Vorstenlanden 
- Assistant-resident of Cirebon 
- Resident of Tegal and Pekalongan 
- Inspector of Cultivations 
 
1823-1828 
 
 
1828-1830 
 
1830-1833 
1833-1834 
1834 
1833-1838 
 
Valck, Frans Gerardus 
(1799-1842)362 
 
 
- Assistant-resident, and later  resident of 
Karawang  
- Resident of Kedu 
 
1823-1826 
 
1826-1830 
                                                          
359 Van der Aa, Biographisch woordenboek 17-1: 26-8. 
360 Van der Aa, Biographisch woordenboek 17-1: 632-3. KITLV 647, ‘Namenlijst der residenten.’; Carey, The 
power of prophecy: 809-810, 948. See also the lemma on Van on Sevenhoven Geneagraphie - Families all over 
the world, accessed via: http://geneagraphie.com/getperson.php?personID=I1405878&tree=1 [4-11-2014]. 
361 NA Koloniën: 3101 (Stamboeken van Oost-Indische ambtenaren, met klappers. 1819-1839): 159. KITLV 647, 
‘Namenlijst der residenten’; R. Bertrand, État colonial, noblesse et nationalisme à Java: la tradition parfait 
(Paris: Karthala, 2005): 221; R. Knight, ‘The visible hand in Tempo Doeloe: The culture of management and the 
organization of business in Java's colonial sugar industry’ in: Journal Of Southeast Asian Studies, 30/1 (1999): 
74-98: 82. 
362 KITLV 647, ‘Namenlijst der residenten’; see also: Stoler, Along the archival grain: 228. 
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- Resident of Yogyakarta 
- Resident of Surabaya (ad interim) 
- Resident of Yogyakarta 
 
1831-1848 
1839 
1838-1841 
3. Javanese rulers, chiefs and other native servants  
Names, titles, alternative names 
and dates 
Positions  
Dipanagara, Pangeran (Raden 
Mas Ontowiryo) 
(1785-1855) 
 
Leader of the Java War 1825-1830 
Kartareja 
 
Unknown; nobleman in or near Grobogan Unknown 
Mangkudiningrat II, Pangeran 
Adipati, Colonel Raden 
Tummenggung Mankuwijaya 
(Mangku Vijaya) 
(dates unknown)363 
 
Pangeran Adipati Mangkudiningrat 
Granted the principality of Kalibawang in fief 
28th April 1831. Exiled to Ambon in December 
1831. 
1824-1831 
Mangkunegara I, Kanjeng Gusti 
Pangeran Adipati Arya 
(Pangeran Sambernyawa, 
Raden Mas Said) 
(1726-1795) 
 
Founder and first ruler of the Mangkunegaran 
Principality, vazal state of the Dutch 
1757-1796 
Mangkunegara II, Kanjeng Gusti 
Pangeran Adipati Arya 
(Pangeran Surya Mataram, 
Pangeran Surya Mangkubumi, 
Pangeran Adipati Prangwadana) 
(1768-1835)364 
 
Adipati of Mangkunegaran 1796-1835 
Mangkunegara III, Kanjeng 
Gusti Pangeran Adipati Arya 
(Raden Mas Sarengat, Pangeran 
Riyo, Pangeran Arya Prabu 
Prangwadana) 
(1803-1853) 
 
Adipati of Mangkunegaran 1835–1853 
Nataraja, Mas Tummengung 
‘Major’ (Notorojo; Nottorojoh; 
Bupati Purwodadi Grobogan) 
(Dates unknown) 
Regent (bupati) of Grobogan 
Fired in 1839. 
?-1839 
   
1819-1829 
                                                          
363 See the webpage on Yogyakarta in: C. Buyers, ‘The Royal Ark, Royal and Ruling Houses of Africa, Asia, 
Oceania and the Americas’. Accessed via: http://www.royalark.net/Indonesia/yogya5.htm [9-11-2014]; Carey, 
The power of prophecy: 921. See for an extensive overview of nobles and other officials in Surakarta and 
Yogyakarta: Carey, The power of prophecy: 760-777, 795-806. 
364 Ricklefs, A history of modern Indonesia since c. 1200: 145; See also: P. Truhart, Regents of nations: 
systematic chronology of states and their political representatives in past and present; a biographical reference 
book. Part 3: Asia & Pacific Oceania (München: K.G. Saur, 2nd revised and enlarged ed. 2003): 1233. 
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Prabuningrat, Pangeran Adipati 
(Wiranagara, Raden 
Tumenggung; Mas Mukudin; 
Wiraguna) 
(1790-?)365 
 
Yogya Army Commander (“Wedana Gedhe 
Prajurit”) 
Titular Major 
Colonel 
Pangeran Adipati Prabuningrat 
Exiled to Banda in 1832 
 
1828- 
1830- 
1830-1832 
 
Sasradiningrat II, 
(Sosrodiningrat II), Kanjeng 
Raden Adipati (Sosro Diningrat 
II; Pangeran Mangkupraya; 
previously Sasrawijaya II [Sasra 
Vijaya; Sosrowijoyo], Raden 
Tumenggung)366 
(?-1846) 
 
Patih of the Sunan of Surakarta 
 
1812-1846 
 
Sastrawidakda, Raden Ngabehi 
(Sastrowidakdo) 
(dates unknown) 
 
 
Son of Sasradiningrat II, position unknown 
 
Unknown 
Pakubuwana IV, Kanjeng 
Susuhanan Prabhu Sri (Sunan 
Bagus; Raden Mas Subadya) 
(1768-1820) 
Sunan (or: Susuhunan) of Surakarta 1788-1820 
 
Pakubuwana VI, Kanjeng 
Susuhanan Prabhu Sri (Sinuhun 
Bangun Tapa; Raden Mas 
Sapardan) 
(1807-1849) 
 
Sunan of Surakarta 
Removed from  throne and exiled to Ambon in 
1830 
 
1823-1830 
 
Pakubuwana VII, Kanjeng 
Susuhanan Prabhu Sri (Raden 
Mas Malikis Solikin) 
(1796-1858) 
 
Sunan of Surakarta 
 
1830-1858 
 
Prawiradiningrat, Pangeran 
Raden Tumenggung Arya 
(dates unknown) 
 
Regent of Kendal 
 
1830s 
 
Tejakusuma, Demang Raden 
Panji 
(dates unknown) 
 
Demang of Keboncandi 
 
?-1832 
 
Wereya Sentana 
(dates unknown) 
 
Lurah of desa Sadee 
 
Unknown 
  
                                                          
365 Carey, The power of prophecy: 100, 553,961,  
366 See the webpage on Surakarta in: Buyers, ‘The Royal Ark’. Accessed via: 
http://www.royalark.net/Indonesia/solo6.htm [9-11-2014]. 
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Maps 
 
 
Map 1: Java’s administrative divisions at the conclusion of Daendels’ term, 1811. 
Source: R. Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000): 123. 
(May be consulted via: www.indonesianhistory.info.) Dutch spelling retained to minimize changes to the 
original. 
 
Map 2: Java’s administrative divisions, 1832-1866. 
Source: Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia: 125. 
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Map 3: The Dutch East Indies, 1840. 
Source: Petri Otto, Nederlandsch Oost-Indië (Rotterdam: A. Baedeker, 1840). Accessed via: http://maps.library.leiden.edu/ [8-11-2014]. 
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Map 4: The principalities: Surakarta, Yogyakarta and Mangkunegaran on Central Java. 
Source: ‘Map of New Mataram after the Java War in 1830’, drawn by Revo Arka Giri Soekatno, based on Cribb,  
Historical Atlas of Indonesia: 114. 
Licensed under the GFDL by the author; Released under the GNU Free Documentation License. Retrieved via: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mataram_1830-en.png [8-11-2014]. 
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Map 5: Overview of the administrative divisions in the residency of Semarang. 
Source: J. Smulders, Kaart aangevende 1° de verdeeling van Java en Madura in gewesten en wat de 
gouvernements-residentiën betreft ook in afdeelingen en districten, een en ander overeenkomstig de jongste 
wijzigingen in de administratieve indeeling, 2° de districten bij de gouvernements-koffiecultuur ingedeeld, 
zoomede de voor die cultuur gereserveerde streken, 3° de in de gouvernementslanden aanwezige 
landbouwondernemingen, 4° de particuliere landerijen en 5° de spoor- stoomtram- post- en groote wegen ('s-
Gravenhage: Smulders, 1884). Accessed via: http://maps.library.leiden.edu/ [8-11-2014]. (Edited by Maarten 
Manse, 2014.) 
Map 6: Overview of the administrative divisions in the residency of Pasuruan. 
Source: Smulders, Kaart aangevende 1° de verdeeling van Java en Madura. (Edited by Maarten Manse, 2014.) 
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 Glossary367 
 
Adat Indonesian native customary law, consuetude, norms and 
values. 
 
Lit.: ‘habit’, ‘tradition’, ‘custom’ (Arabic: ‘ʿādah’). Customary 
Javanese law, used by Dutchmen to control and legitimize the 
legal system for the Javanese population. 
 
Adipati 
 
High predicative noble-title, ‘duke’. 
 
Lit.: ‘overlord’ (Sanskrit: ‘Adhi’ [over, supra -chief] and Pati 
[lord]); predicative title, used in conjunction with other titles 
(often with pangeran; see below), to indicate a senior prince or 
nobleman, often with an extensive apanage and a quasi-
independent position at the court.368 
 
Adjudant Komnmisaris 
Inspecteur voor de 
buiten-Etablissementen 
 
Assistant commissary-inspector for the outer-territories  
(Dutch governor over the outer-territories in Sumatra). 
 
Algemene Secretarie 
 
General Secretariat,  
Dutch colonial administrative office supporting the Governor-
General. 
 
Alun-alun 
 
Central square in Javanese towns, usually in front of the regent’s 
residence or kraton. 
 
Arya 
 
High predicative administrative title. 
 
                                                          
367 Large parts of this glossary are based on Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies vol. 2: 457-62; Van den 
Berg, Inlandsche rangen en titels and Carey, The power of prophecy: 839-44. 
368 Carey, The power of prophecy: 839. 
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Lit.: ‘someone from one of the three high castes’ or ‘man of high 
caste’ (Sanskrit); title used for high-ranking administrative 
officials. 
 
Assistant-resident 
 
Dutch colonial official, below resident (see below). 
 
Bagus 
 
Honorific. 
 
Lit.: ‘handsome’, ‘nice’, ‘good’ (Malay; used for males). 
 
Batig Slot 
 
Profit gained out the production of cash crops on Java that 
flowed to the Netherlands. 
 
Bendahara 
 
Administrative position in classic Malay kingdoms, comparable 
to vizir or ‘patih’ (see above). Bendara’s were usually appointed 
by Sultans (see below)  with whom they shared the same lineage. 
 
Lit.: ‘lord’ (Javanese), probably derived from ‘Bhandagara’ 
(Sanskrit:  treasury). 
 
Binnenlands Bestuur 
 
European civil service in colonial Java. 
 
Lit.: ‘interior administration’ (Dutch). 
 
Bupati 
 
Regent, landlord. Native head of a regency (see above). 
 
Lit.: ‘landlord’ (Sansrkit: ‘Bhu’ [earth], ‘Pati’ [lord]); ruler of a 
specific limited area. 
 
Bureaucratization 
 
Term Weber uses to identify the modernizing process that 
formed modern bureaucracies: states managed by rules formed 
by a hierarchical construction, strictly separated from personal 
interests conducted on the base of written documents and run 
by rightly qualified civil servants (see below). 
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Berufsmensch 
 
Servants that are qualified for and conducted their job based on 
professionalism, competency and out of vocation. 
 
Lit.: ‘man of vocation’ (German). 
 
Cultivation system 
(Cultuurstelsel) 
 
Dutch tax-system on Java from 1830 to 1870, that made use of 
the Javanese aristocracy so set up large cash-crop plantations. 
 
Cacah 
 
Household, used as a unit of measurement for land and 
population on Java to determine taxation rights. 
 
Lit. ‘to count’ (Malay/Indonesian). 
 
Controleur 
(kontroleur) 
 
Dutch colonial official, below the assistant-resident. 
 
Lit.: ‘controller’, ‘overseer’, ‘inspector’ (Dutch). 
 
Controleur der 
landbouwinkomsten 
 
Inspector of agricultural incomes, Dutch colonial official in the 
residency responsible for checking agricultural income. 
 
Controleur der cultures 
 
Inspector of cultivations. 
 
Demang 
 
District head. 
 
Title of middle-ranking provincial official on Java with special 
tax-collecting responsibilities, residing at court of a higher noble. 
(Javanese/Malay). 
 
Desa 
 
Village or complex of houses on Java, usually with ricefields and 
orchards attached in rural areas. 
 
Dual Mandate 
 
Mandate written by Sir Frederick Lugard in 1922 that proposed 
state-sponsored colonialism in British Tropical Africa via indirect 
rule. 
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Eyang 
 
Style the Javanese were expected to use in respect to the 
Governor-General. 
 
Lit.: ‘grandfather’ (Javanese). 
 
Governor-General 
 
Highest Dutch colonial official on Java, highest authority in the 
administrative body. 
 
Grote Postweg 
 
‘The Grand Post Road’, large, important road on Java 
constructed under the Governorship of H.W. Daendels in 1808 
that connected East to West Java and therefore improved the 
(economic) connectivity on the island. 
 
Gusti 
 
Noble honorific, lord, preceding title. 
 
Lit.: ‘lord’ (Javanese, Malay). 
 
Herendiensten 
 
Construction and maintenance work executed by the population 
of Java for the regents (for 66 days annually), under mandate of 
the cultivation system. Aimed at improving Java’s infrastructure 
and stimulate the local economy, but imposed a heavy burden 
on the Javanese peasants. 
 
Lit.: ‘Lord-services’ (Dutch). 
 
Hormat 
 
Respect, honor, used to prescribe cultural and  lingual behavior 
on Java. 
 
Indology  
(Indologie) 
 
 
In the nineteenth century the study of history, languages, law, 
religions and philosophy of the Dutch East Indies, preparing 
Dutchmen for colonial service in the Indies. 
 
Jaxa 
 
Prosecutor. 
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Lit.: ‘supervisor’ (Sanskrit: ‘Adhyaksha’ [supervisor, inspector]), 
on Java especially member of judiciary, in modern use public 
attorney. 
 
Kanjeng 
 
Noble honorific, preceding title. 
 
Lit.: ‘your foot’ (Old-Javanese: ‘Kang’ [pronoun] and ‘Jeng’ 
[foot]). 
 
Karya 
 
Agricultural lands used as a measurement to determine 
production output. 
 
Lit.: ‘work’ (Malay/Indonesian). 
 
Kerbau 
 
Buffalo. 
 
Kesekten 
 
Supernatural power a Javanese ruler was thought to receive 
straight from the macro-cosmos.  
 
From: ‘Sekti’, lit.: power (Sanskrit: ‘çakti’). 
 
Knevelarijen 
 
Extortions, ‘maltreatments’ and abuses of Javanese regents of 
their own population to punish or deal with peasants that acted 
against the interests of the regents. 
 
Krama 
 
Highest register of Javanese, polite and formal style, used by 
persons of lower status to persons of higher status, for example 
subordinates to bosses, or between those of the same status 
when they do not wish to be informal. The other registers are 
Ngoko (intermediate form) and Madya (informal form). 
 
Lit.: ‘moral’, ‘norm’. ‘custom’ (Javanese). 
 
Kraton 
 
Palace or residential compound of a Javanese ruler. 
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Lit: ‘ke-ratu-an’, residency of the ratu (see below). 
 
Kris 
 
Javanese dagger, often considered to possess supernatural 
powers. 
 
Kuwu 
 
Title used for village chief, mostly used around Cirebon and 
Indramayu. 
 
Lit.: ‘chief’ (Javanese). 
 
Kyai 
 
Honorific used for senior noblemen. 
 
Lit.: ‘venerable’. Usually Kyai is used for older noble’s, especially 
teachers of religious and spiritual disciplines. Also used to refer 
to special kris or other pusaka (see below). 
 
Landrent (landrente) 
 
Taxation system in which the colonial government considered 
itself owner of all ground and rented this to the local chiefs and 
population who had to paid tax over this land. On Java 
introduced by Raffles in 1813. 
 
Lungguh 
 
Landholdings or apanages on Java, usually distributed as gifts or 
payments by regents to apanage holders. 
 
Lit.: ‘seat’ (Javanese). 
 
Lurah 
 
Village chief. 
 
Lit.: ‘chief’ (Malay). 
 
Mancanagara 
 
Periphery or outer regions of a kingdom (as distinct from the 
inner areas near the court or capital [see below: Negara agung]), 
governed by semi-autonomous bupati (see above). 
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Lit.: ‘foreign states’ (Javanese: ‘Manca’ [foreign] and ‘Negara’ 
[state]). 
 
Mandala 
 
Political structure of inner kingdom-relations among different 
rulers. 
 
Lit.: ‘circle’ (Sanskrit). 
 
Mantri 
 
Minister. 
 
(Sanskrit). 
 
Mas 
 
Form of address; predicative title or honorific. 
 
Lit.: ‘gold’ (Malay); used as a prefix to combine with and 
emphasize other titles. 
 
Max Havelaar, of de 
koffi-veilingen der 
Nederlandsche Handel-
Maatschappy 
 
Novel by Eduard Douwes Dekker published under the pseudonym 
of Multatuli in 1860, which became one of the most important 
critics against the cultivation system and Dutch colonialism in 
general of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
 
(English title: Max Havelaar: Or the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch 
Trading Company). 
 
Memorie van Overgave 
 
Final Memorandum (of resignation or transfer); final report a 
resident presented at the end of his term in a particular residency 
to his successor. 
 
Ngabehi 
 
Commander, predicative administrative title. 
 
Lit.: ‘he whose rule stretches over all’ (Javanese/Sundanese: 
From: ‘kabeh’ (Sanskrit: everything); title of (usually military) 
officials. 
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Negara agung The core regions or crown domain under direct authority of the 
central ruler (as distinct from the outer areas [see above: 
Mancanegara]). 
 
Lit.: ‘general state’ (Malay). 
 
Paduka 
 
Noble honorific, preceding title. 
 
Lit.: ‘shoe’ (Sanskrit). 
 
Panembahan 
 
Noble title. 
 
Lit.: ‘Object of  reverential salutation’ (Malay: from ‘Sembah’ 
[‘honorable greeting’]); high princely title used for older or 
highly respected members of a ruling family who were closely 
related to the ruler.369 
 
Pangeran 
 
Prince. 
 
Lit.: ‘the one who is waited for’ or ‘object of attention’ (Old-
Javanese: ‘Angher’ [to wait for someone]; title used for Javanese 
princes. 
 
Pangreh Praja 
 
Java’s colonial native civil service in the areas under direct Dutch 
rule. 
 
Lit.: ‘rulers of the realm (Old-Javanese). 
 
Panji 
 
Title used for young men of high nobility. 
 
                                                          
369 According to Schrieke Panembahan means ‘object of veneration’, while Susuhunan is translated by him as 
“‘royal foot’ (placed upon the head of vassal paying homage)”, but etymologically Van den Berg’s explanation 
sems to make more sense.  
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Lit.: ‘nickname’, ‘honorific’ (Old-Javanese); a title given to youths 
who served as intimate retainers of the rulers and to military 
commanders at the courts.370 
 
Patih 
 
Chief minister, ‘vizir’. 
 
Lit.: ‘lord’ (Sanskrit); title used for chief ministers, ‘vizir’ or chief 
advisors of a ruler. 
 
Patrimonialism 
 
Title used by Weber to identify a (state) structure in which 
personal or patrimonial relations between a ruler and his 
officials (often kinship-related) are most important and 
determine policy. 
 
Patriots 
 
Political faction in the Dutch Republic in the late eighteenth 
century struggling for the removal of the Prince of Orange and 
the settlement of a new republic. 
 
Pendopo 
 
Typical pavilion in front of the regent’s house. 
 
 
Penghulu 
 
Islamic priest and head of a religious hierarchy on Java and 
Sumatra. 
 
Lit.: ‘chief’ (Malay). 
 
Pflicht 
 
‘Vocation’, term Weber uses to identify the burden of civil 
servants to carry out their jobs. 
 
Lit.: ‘duty’ (German). 
 
Plantloon 
 
Wage received by the Javanese peasants during the cultivation 
system, depending on the yields of cash-crop production. 
                                                          
370 Carey, The power of prophecy: 842. 
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Lit.: ‘planting salary’ (Dutch). 
 
Prabhu/Prabu 
 
Predicative used as a part of royal titles, ‘emperor’, as 
distinguished from ratu. 
 
Lit.: ‘Master’, ‘supreme lord’ (Sanskrit). Prabu is the Javanese 
form of of Sanskrit Prabhu. 
 
Preanger (Priangan) 
 
Mountainous region in West-Java. 
 
Priyayi 
 
Aristocrat or official, member of governing elite on Java; also 
characteristics of this class. 
 
Lit.: ‘the younger brothers of the king’ (Javanese). 
 
Pusaka 
 
Heirlooms or holy regalia, handed down from generation to 
generation, often considered to possess supernatural powers 
(see also: kris). 
 
Lit.: ‘treasure’, ‘heirloom’ (Sanskrit). 
 
Raad van Indië  
 
Colonial advisory body of the Governor-General. 
 
Lit.: ‘Board of the Indies’ 9Dutch). 
 
Raden 
 
Javanese noble title; ‘king’. 
 
Lit.: ‘Lord’ (Old-Javanese: ‘Hadyan’ [lord] with the predicate ‘Ra’ 
[predicate used for addressing honoured persons]). 
 
Raja 
 
Asian (royal) ruler. 
 
Lit.: ‘king’, ‘ruler’ (Sanskrit). 
  
106 
 
Rangga Predicative administrative title. 
 
Lit.: ‘head’ (Sanskrit: ‘Warangga’); title used for different types 
of Javanese officials. 
 
Ratu 
 
Queen, Austronesian word for ruler. 
Lit.: ‘Lord’ (Old-Javanese: ‘Tu’ [lord] with the predicate ‘Ra’ 
[predicate used for addressing honoured persons]). Became 
increasingly used just for female rulers. 
 
Regeringscommisaris 
 
Government Commissioner, Dutch representative in the outer 
territories. 
 
Regency 
 
Dutch standardization of an administrative body; ruled by a 
regent (see below). 
 
Regent (Bupati) 
 
Native head of a regency (kebupaten). 
 
Residency 
 
Colonial provincial administrative body on Java since the reign of 
Daendels. Consisted of multiple regencies, ruled by a resident 
(see below). 
 
Residency archives 
 
Local archives of the residencies in the colonial archives of the 
National archives of Indonesia in Jakarta. 
 
Resident 
 
Dutch colonial official, highest authority in and head of a 
residency, represented the Dutch colonial government in the 
residencies or provinces. 
 
From: ‘resideren’ (Dutch: ‘to reside’). 
 
Sawah 
 
Wet ricefield. 
 
Sultan 
 
King. 
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Islamic title, equal to king. Lit.: ‘ruler’ (Arabic, from: ‘salat’: ‘to 
rule’). 
 
Susuhunan 
 
Javanese emperor. 
 
Lit.: ‘Object of veneration’ (Old-Javanese: ‘Suhun’, from the verb 
‘Anuhun’ [to cary something on the head, to treat something 
respectfully]);  title for the rulers of Mataram from 1624 
onwards and for the rulers of Surakarta from 1755 onwards 
(after the partition of Mataram). Comparable to ‘Emperor’.371  
 
Tijdschrift voor 
Nederlandsch Indië 
 
Journal of the Dutch East Indies; nineteenth century journal 
founded by the Dutch preacher W.R. van Hoëvell that ran from 
1838 until 1894. 
 
Tirakat 
 
Religious practice of retreatment and practice of meditation and 
asceticism. 
 
Tummengung 
 
High predicative administrative title. 
 
(Probably from Old-Javanese: ‘Tu’ [lord] and ‘Manggung’ 
[resistant]), title used for Javanese high-ranking administrative 
officials, usually awarded to bupati (regents; see above). 
 
Tuan (tuwan) 
 
Lord, honorific. 
 
Lit.: ‘old’ (Malay). 
 
VOC 
 
Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (lit.: United East-Indian 
Company; the Dutch East India Trading Company), active in large 
parts of the Indian Ocean hemisphere and other parts of Asia 
and South-Africa, from the beginning of the seventeenth until 
the end of the eighteenth century. 
                                                          
371 Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies vol. 2: 461; van den Berg, Inlandsche rangen en titels: 2. 
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Vorstenlanden 
 
Principalities, the indirectly ruled states of Central Java in 
Yogyakarta and Surakarta. 
  
Wali Sanga 
 
The nine legendary preachers, saints or apostle’s of Islam on 
Java. 
 
Wayah 
 
Term the Dutch used to style their Javanese counterparts, 
regents, and other native rulers. 
 
Lit.: ‘grandson’ (Javanese). 
 
Wayang 
 
Javanese puppet theatre. 
 
Wedono 
 
District head, minister. 
 
Lit.: ‘Face’ (Sanskrit: ‘Wadana’ [face, head, top corner of a 
triangle]), chief, high minister of crown under the patih (see 
above). 
 
Wingewest 
 
Dutch term for the colonies, used, by Van den Bosch to stress 
that the crown-domains of the Dutch in the colonial world 
needed to be used by the Dutch solely to make profit and be 
beneficial to the mother country, and not to ‘spread civilization’ 
or educate the native inhabitants. 
 
Lit.: ‘region/area of profit’, ‘colony’ (Dutch). 
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